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Abstract
This dissertation uses the methods of literary linguistics to investigate syntax
in experimental literary texts. It focuses on two prose texts by Samuel Beckett,
How It Is and Worstward Ho, analysing the different kinds of linguistic devia-
tions that occur and considering how they may be related to the experimental
style of the texts. The first chapter introduces some of the main issues of lit-
erary linguistics and argues for a formalist approach to the study of syntax in
experimental texts. The second chapter discusses a number of theoretical issues
surrounding the study of experimental texts, describing the style of How It Is
in detail and how this style impacts on the reading process. The third chapter
describes the kinds of unusual utterances that occur in How It Is, analysing
both discourse features like parentheticals and grammatical features like ellipsis
and how they are used and abused in the text. The fourth chapter discusses
Worstward Ho in a similar matter, and the analysis shows up continuities with
the kinds of deviation in How It Is. The fifth chapter discusses many issues
that arise from the analysis, describing how ungrammatical utterances are in-
terpreted in terms of grammatical and pragmatic theory, and many other issues
relevant to linguistic theory, literary linguistic theory and literary theory arise
in the course of this discussion.
The conclusion thus states that there are fundamental constraints on ex-
vi
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perimentation with syntax in literature, and that these kinds of constraints are
peculiar to language as a medium. In most cases, experimentation with syntax
does not involve syntactic processes, and that the majority of the interpretation
involved in reading experimental texts is pragmatic rather than grammatical.
The conclusion also offers an affirmation of the formalist approach to literary
linguistics, and proposals for a re-examination of some aspects of pragmatic
theory.
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Aim
This dissertation uses the methods of literary linguistics to investigate exper-
imental uses of literary language. I consider what kinds of formal experimen-
tation are possible with natural language, examine how the unusual forms of
experimental literature are interpreted, and ask what these kinds of experimen-
tation show us about the nature of language. To begin with, I will discuss the
goals of this study in detail, outlining the theoretical basis for a linguistic study
of experimental literature and what may be learned from such a study.
Literary linguistics is concerned with understanding how literary texts use
language, focusing on formal aspects of literary texts and how they are related to
the formal features of language. Language is the medium of literary texts, and
the formal aspects of these texts - such as metre or genre - are in part enabled by
using this medium. To understand regularities in the formal aspects of literary
texts, literary linguistics research explores regularities in linguistic form and
the ways in which the literary form exploits linguistic form. It has thus been
1
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successful in accounting for kinds of verbal art which belong to specific traditions
and are strongly regulated: for example, metrical verse has been explored by
generative phonological theory, with regularities across traditions and languages
accounted for in terms of linguistic theory (Fabb & Halle 2008).
1.2 Experimental literature
This dissertation will use these methods to explore the formal aspects of exper-
imental literature. This may appear to be a problematic case at first. While
writers in literary traditions value adherence to rules and produce texts which
are highly regular - as in metrical poetry, or detective fiction - avant garde writ-
ers value breaking rules and producing texts which resist regularity to create
new forms. However, just as the medium of language enables the creation of
literary forms, it also constrains this creation, and even if a writer appears to be
breaking many rules in their experimental texts, they may still be constrained
by linguistic rules that they may not be aware of. The extent of this constraint
on artistic practice is a fundamental issue for theory of the avant garde, and
linguistic theory allows us to answer this question based on formal evidence,
by exploring regularities in the possibilities and constraints of experimentation
with language in literature.
In addition, experimental literary language also presents a number of inter-
esting questions for linguistics. First, the constraints on the practice of experi-
mental writers indicate the extent of linguistic rules, and studying the kinds of
rules which can and cannot be broken gives an insight into the nature of these
rule systems. Second, the extreme cases of avant garde experimentations with
language may provide evidence of deep regularities within linguistic rules that
are not readily visible in conventional language. Third, experimentation with
language in these texts often produces ungrammaticality, yet these texts are
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usually still interpretable even in the most extreme cases. By examining the
ways in which these ungrammatical texts hold together and are interpreted, we
may be able to consider the difficulties of ascertaining degrees of grammaticality
and any absolutes in linguistic study.
Fourth, by considering the results of these inquiries, we may then be able to
engage with a fundamental question within literary linguistics. Throughout the
history of linguistic studies of literature, scholars have considered what it is that
makes a text ‘literary’ - is literary language1 different from ‘normal’ language?
This question can be considered by looking at the linguistic issues listed above.
Regarding the scope of linguistic rules, we can ask whether these rules can be
broken more readily in literary texts. Regarding the ways in which ungram-
matical texts hold together, we may ask whether there is anything about the
literary context that allows texts to be interpreted more readily. Asking these
questions thus allows to ask whether literary language is discernibly different
from normal language, based on the evidence of the formal analysis.
1.3 Literary linguistics: methodology
1.3.1 Formalism and functionalism
Linguistics can be divided into two basic approaches, functionalism and formal-
ism, and these methods are differentiated by their ways of studying language.
Functionalism involves studying the connection between the form of language
and its function. In literary linguistics, this approach is typified by stylistics,
which involves linguistic analysis of language use to develop critical understand-
ings of texts, investigating how formal aspects of style contribute to the mean-
ings of texts. By contrast, formalist studies are not concerned with how form
1It is important to emphasise that ‘literary language’ is only one aspect of the formal study
of literariness, and that there is a great deal of work on the various other aspects. For an
introduction to many of these other aspects see Zwaan 1994.
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functions to create meaning within texts, focusing instead on how linguistic form
is exploited in literary form (Fabb 1997: 9). Whereas for stylistics the focus is
on texts, in formalist literary linguistics the focus is language, and as a result
this work is more concerned with theoretical linguistics than literary criticism.
This dissertation adopts a formalist rather than a functionalist approach,
for important reasons. First, functionalist approaches to experimentation in
literature tend towards text and function-specific analyses (see D’Haen et al
1989). In contrast, this study is concerned with examining experimental practice
more generally, and this is a typically formalist method. Second, a formalist
investigation into experimental literature allows us to ask the questions about
linguistic theory mentioned above, whereas a functionalist approach would be
more concerned with text-specific readings. That is, one can ask what can be
learned from experimental literature as cultural practice, rather than asking
what individual authors and texts say. It is arguable that such an approach is
truer to the avant garde and its role in literature, and this may explain the close
affinity between the two fields in the 20th century, as with the close relationship
between the Futurists and Russian Formalists in the 1920’s (Erlich 1980 [1969];
see also Steiner 1984).
Nevertheless, for a study of this scale it is necessary to focus the field of
inquiry. Therefore I focus on one specific aspect of language under experimen-
tation in a few specific works by a single author. These choices are motivated
by practical considerations.
1.3.2 What aspect of language to study
In choosing an aspect of language for study, there are a number of factors to
consider. This study focuses on linguistic rules and their role in experimental
literature, and the choice is largely based on a specific definition of what can be
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 5
called ‘linguistics’. The majority of linguists agree that linguistics is the study
of grammar and the formal aspects of natural language. However, there is con-
tinuing debate about the nature of ‘grammar’ itself. For some, grammar can
“in large parts or in totality, be reduced to facts derivable from the properties
of some general human attribute (i.e. an attribute not specific to language)”
(Newmeyer 1983: 96). Implicit in this approach is a rejection of the need to
construct a well-defined formal grammar, appealing instead to general expla-
nation in relation to the functions of language, and in the absence of a formal
system linguistic rules become so unclear that they are virtually meaningless.
The opposite approach is that of generative linguistics, in which grammar is
viewed as an autonomous formal system based in human biology. In this field,
grammar is constituted of syntax, morphology and phonology, and these aspects
are understood to have a degree of psychological reality that exists indepen-
dently of meaning and communication. Therefore in the generative tradition,
‘linguistic’ is narrowly defined as anything of or relating to formal grammar, and
anything outside of this system, such as discourse or meaning, is attributable to
one’s wider knowledge of the world. Linguistic rules are thus narrowly defined
and amenable to objective study.
For this research, I focus on one system of linguistic rules, syntax, and this
choice is made for a number of reasons. First, since the 1950s syntax has been
central to contemporary linguistics, and it remains to this day a fruitful area
for theoretical inquiry. The kinds of research questions outlined above are close
to the concerns of current theoretical syntax, so the questions asked by this
research could have interesting answers. Second, syntax seems to attract ex-
perimentation in literature more frequently than morphology and phonology.
This could be because the rules of syntax are more readily accessible to in-
trospection, or because syntax is the maximal realisation of linguistic form,
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governing whole sentences, whereas morphology and phonology govern phrase
and word-internal relations; one may argue that the larger units of language is
more readily amenable to manipulation. There are also sociological factors to
consider: the central place of syntax in the prescriptive grammars of literate
cultures has made it a prime target for rule-breaking in experimental litera-
ture2. While there have been poetic traditions which attempt to experiment
with the rules of morphology and phonology (Rothenberg 1985; Janecek 1996),
experimentation with sentence structure is prominent throughout many liter-
ary traditions, as evidenced by the amount of critical works on the syntax of a
variety of writers3.
Thirdly, and most importantly, syntax is unique in that it facilitates the
creative aspect of human language. Whereas “[phonological] and morpholog-
ical systems are essentially closed finite ones” (Newmeyer 1986: 19), syntax
facilitates the recursive and combinatorial abilities of utterance production and
allows the language user to create an infinite set of novel utterances (Chomsky
1971 [1957]: 18-25). Syntax is therefore the most important aspect of linguistic
form to the creative use of language, so it may be a safe assumption that it has
an important part to play in linguistic studies of literature. It should be noted
that this use of ‘creative’ refers specifically to the ability to create new utter-
ances of any kind, and it does not necessarily correspond directly to the general
meaning of ‘creative’ as ‘artistic and inventive’. This definition of creative has
as much to do with the creativity of ideas and meanings as forms of language,
so these two uses should not be viewed as coextensive.
2Indeed Taylor-Batty (2007) argues that this is a factor in some of Beckett’s texts, describ-
ing how L’Innommable is ‘characterised by a style that mimics the forms and formulations of
a grammar drill.’
3For example, there have been works on the syntax of Joyce (Wales 1992), Milton (Banfield
1973), Shakespeare (Hope 2003) and Shelley (Austin 1981).
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1.3.3 Syntax as the subject of literary linguistic analysis
What, then, is syntax as a subject of formalist literary linguistic analysis? The
most successful work so far in formalist literary linguistics has been in metrics,
where the advances of generative phonology have enabled the explanation of
metrical patterning. The metrical form of a text is a kind of literary form, and
it is built by a system of rules and conditions from the underlying linguistic
form (i.e. its phonological prosodic form) (Fabb 2002: 4). The description and
explanation of the system of rules and conditions that convert linguistic form
into literary form is the generative metrics project, and there has been a great
deal of progress in developing this understanding (for a recent summary, see
Dresher & Friedberg 2006).
Whether we can develop a similar theory for syntax depends on a number
of factors. The two areas have certain features in common. Just as metrics in-
volves building literary form by regulating linguistic form, the same occurs with
syntax, such as in syntactic parallelism. This involves identifying instances
of structural similarity between syntactic forms, and considering what literary
effects the repetitions of these structures may have. However, there are funda-
mental differences between metrical form and syntactic parallelism. Parallelism
may not be as tightly constrained by linguistic form as meter, and there is no
equivalent to the metrical template in syntactic patterning (Fabb 1997: 159).
While there may be regular repetitions in a particular literary text, there is no
way of characterising the kinds of repetitions one may and may not generate,
or how they are generated, as with metrical form. Outside of a few highly arti-
ficial literary traditions4 , there is no ‘syntactic template’ to match the metrical
templates found in literary traditions throughout the world. This fundamental
4One example of a tradition that gives rise to this kind of contrived syntactic form is the
‘Oulipo’, a French literary school founded in the 1950s. The Oulipo was founded on the idea of
writing under specific constraints, and there are some examples of homosyntactic constraints
in Matthews & Brotchie (2005).
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difference indicates that a formalist approach to syntax in terms of parallelism
would be theoretically limited and unfruitful.
As an alternative approach, some critics advise that the goal of linguistic
analysis of literary texts is to describe the “purely syntactic processes that
contribute to a given text’s linguistic identity” (Austin 1984: 13). This approach
is built for stylistic analysis, and the notion of “linguistic identity” on which it
is predicated is text and author-specific, described by generalising the kinds of
linguistic choices present in the texts, such as frequently occurring constructions,
and ‘deviations’ from normal usage. The former approach is common in many
related fields, such as authorship studies, and is particularly useful when dealing
with relations of identity, but it is because of this specificity that it resists
formalization. The latter - deviation - is more theoretically problematic.
The concept of deviation in linguistic usage has attracted discussion ever
since the inception of generative linguistics. In response to Roman Jakobson’s
criticism that some of the sentences deemed ungrammatical in Syntactic Struc-
tures could be found in poetry, Chomsky argued that this point was irrelevant
since “it is perfectly plain that deviation from well-formedness is not only toler-
able, in prose and poetry, but can even be effectively used as a literary device”
(Chomsky 1961: 231). Literary critics have proposed many different ways of
dealing with deviation, as summarised by Austin (1984: 27-34): we adjust the
standard rules of syntax to accommodate the deviant forms; we propose that
the writer of deviant sentences is writing in a specific ‘dialect’ of his or her
own, where the rules of syntax allow these forms; or, as Austin suggests, we
acknowledge the deviant forms as ungrammatical, “with all possible relevan-
cies of non-standard syntactic usage to the poet’s purpose being fully explored”
(Austin 1984: 34).
There are two main difficulties with this programme. First, the effort in
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producing these formal accounts does not guarantee the return of a more valid
judgment of textual functions like meaning, as the move from formal account to
interpretation involves the same subjective leap as an intuitive judgment. The
increased rigor of the formalism does not provide the extra theoretical justifi-
cation that stylistics requires to answer the criticisms outlined above. Second,
there is no mention of the degrees of (un)grammaticality exhibited by the de-
viant texts, or why some kinds of deviant forms occur and others do not. Austin
opens his monograph by stating that “[contemporary] theories about the nature
of human language should both influence and be influenced by the analysis of
literary texts” (Austin 1984: 1), but it seems that his programme neglects one
of the fundamental tenets of generative linguistic theory: that any theory about
language should exhibit both descriptive and explanatory adequacy. Austin’s
project is solely descriptive, as it offers no explanation for why certain forms may
occur in literary texts; as a result, it offers no generalisations about language
and fails to feed back into linguistic theory.
How then should one proceed in a formalist literary linguistic analysis of syn-
tax? It is clear that there is merit in both of the general approaches identified
above. The first approach, modeled on the example of generative metrics, ap-
peals to an analysis which is strictly based on how linguistic form is exploited in
literary form; such an approach is theoretically sound as it makes claims about
literary form based on verifiable facts of constitutive form, but practically in-
feasible in dealing with syntactic parallelism, as there is no way of ascertaining
whether there is any linguistic basis for broad regularities in discourse structure.
The second approach, as suggested by Austin, offers an interesting insight into
the kinds of linguistic peculiarities that make literary texts distinctive, but fails
to engage this concept with any theoretical scrutiny. In this research, I synthe-
sise these two approaches. First, I consider whether the syntactic deviations of
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a text are generated by the grammar, just as apparent deviations from metri-
cal form can be explained by considering the underlying phonological form of
a text. Second, I consider whether the use of deviant syntax is related to the
literary aspect of the texts, examining the kinds of deviation that occur and why
they occur. Therefore the goal of this approach is to consider whether one can
produce a formal account of what kind of syntactic structures can be produced
in a literary text.
It should be noted that although this study is concerned with syntax and
grammatical operations, it is assumed that pragmatic theory will play a great
part in any description of the texts. Syntax defines the kinds of structures
that form sentences in a text, but the move from these grammatical objects
to utterances that communicate thoughts - declarations, commands, questions -
always involves inference, and this inferencing process is described by pragmatic
theory. For this study we take the Relevance theory of Sperber & Wilson (1995)
to be our standard description of pragmatic theory.
1.3.4 Which texts to study
The choice of author is Samuel Beckett, focusing specifically on two of his prose
texts, How It Is and Worstward Ho. The selection from Beckett’s work is re-
stricted to his prose, as drama and poetry involve genre-specific features, such
as lineation or performance style, which may complicate the study of syntax;
while the simplicity of prose is only apparent, it nevertheless involves fewer
generic considerations. Beckett’s prose writing is recognised as one of the great-
est achievements of the modernist avant garde, and its experimentation with
language has attracted a great deal of critical attention in literary studies. In-
deed there have been many works which have engaged with the complexity of
Beckett’s syntax before (Abbott 1973; Tseng 1992; Banfield 2003; Taylor-Batty
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2007). However, none of these works has engaged in detailed formal study of
the texts, and there still remain a number of questions to be answered about
Beckett’s formal experimentation. Since this is a formalist investigation, I will
have little to say about the meaning of Beckett’s works or the reasoning behind
his experimental practice, but it is worth noting that, as a writer, Beckett was
deeply concerned with the limitations and constraints of language. This inquiry
therefore has its relevance to studies of Beckett’s writing specifically, as it en-
gages with concepts like “the limits of language” (Kawin 1984) that are crucial
to Beckett’s work.
1.4 Terminology and technical issues
Before proceeding, it may be necessary to clarify the terminology used in this
research, specifically the term ‘experimental literature’. This term is used as
a generic label rather than a claim about a particular kind of practice on the
part of writers, and is thus used interchangeably with ‘avant garde literature’.
A typical dictionary of literary terms defines ‘experimentalism’ as “intellec-
tual/imaginative/creative activity which entails the exploration of new concepts,
techniques, etc., which go beyond convention” (Cuddon 1998: 296), and it is in
this sense that the related terminology is used. The relationship between this
generic sense and the scientific sense of experimentation lies outwith the domain
of this study and I will have little to say about it.
It is also important to note that the first text under examination, How
It Is, was originally written in French and translated into English by Beckett
himself. I have decided to focus on the English texts for practical reasons, as this
dissertation focuses on analysis of the form of the texts and is not concerned
with changes between versions and their meaningful import. The differences
between the French and English texts and their forms of experimentation may
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be of great interest for a study of the different possibilities of the languages, but
I am leaving this question out of the study in order to focus on the research
questions outlined above.
1.5 Study structure
The dissertation will be structured into three main parts. The first part focuses
on characterising the experimental practice of the texts, identifying regularities
and irregularities by close linguistic analysis. The second section builds on these
results, considering the role of linguistic rules and what the regularities of the
analysis may indicate in relation to linguistic theory. The third section then
looks at the ways in which the texts are interpreted, investigating how unusual
or ungrammatical texts hold together and how they are interpreted as literary
texts. The dissertation concludes by discussing the results and considering what
they may indicate for linguistic and literary theory.
Chapter 2
Theoretical issues: reading
How It Is
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter I survey some of the issues at hand in the literary linguistic
analysis of experimental texts. For this purpose I consider some of the diffi-
culties raised by reading How It Is, discussing the formal characteristics of the
experimental style and how it impacts upon interpretation.
2.2 How It Is
How It Is was published in 1964, translated from the French version Com-
ment C’est by Beckett himself. The novel was Beckett’s first substantial prose
piece in the ten years since his trilogy of novels (Molloy, Malone Meurt and
L’Innommable), and it is often recognised as a major stylistic departure (Pilling
1976). Beckett’s previous novels consisted of dense monologues written in long,
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heavily punctuated stop-start sentences which ran for pages. How It Is returned
to similar subject matter, recording the monologue of a mysterious narrator in
grim circumstances, but the style of the texts was very different, at least in its
appearance on the page. The vast paragraphs and sentences were replaced by
brief, unpunctuated paragraphs, made up of short phrases and clauses running
together. The novel is often identified as the text which marked Beckett’s move
to a more “pared-down” style (Cohn 1962; Dearlove 1986).
Since this mode of presentation departs dramatically from conventional prose
style, the style of How It Is can be described as Experimental. The capitalised
term will be used throughout this dissertation as a technical term to refer to a
stylistic description of the text, and this description will be clarified in section
2.5 below. The term ‘Experimental’ has no technical significance beyond this
descriptive use, and in using it I do not make any claims about the intentions
of the author.
The use of punctuation and typographical presentation is one facet of this
Experimentation, and it clearly affects the interpretation of the text1 . In
formal terms, the most immediate effect of this way of writing is the lack of
clearly defined graphological sentences. A graphological sentence of English
can be defined as “a unit beginning with a capital letter and ending with a
full stop” (Leech & Short 2003: 217), and since How It Is lacks any full stops
or capital letters (except for names), one may argue that the novel is not in
fact constituted of graphological sentences. However, the significance of this
point should not be exaggerated; while the disregard of such a convention may
communicate certain meanings in the literary text, its importance should not
be exaggerated since it does not impact directly on linguistic form. Rather, this
treatment of graphological sentences is more important for its indirect influence
1Within the critical literature there are a variety of readings of Beckett’s style and its
relation to the content; for some examples see Hill 1990; Webb 1970.
CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL ISSUES: READING HOW IT IS 15
on the interpretation of grammatical sentences. The connection between written
and grammatical sentences is tied to the larger debate about the relationship
between written and spoken language, which is described briefly in the next
section.
2.3 Grammaticality and the written sentence
The relationship between written and spoken representations of language is
assumed to be irrelevant in some branches of linguistics. Written language is
assumed to represent spoken language directly, with the paralinguistic features
of speech represented by typographical conventions, such as italicization for
stress, commas and full stops for pauses. This tendency is often considered as
a continuation of de Saussure’s conception of speech as the primary form of
language, and it has persisted throughout the twentieth century (Biber 1988:
6). These linguists will conventionally refer to a language user as a ‘speaker’,
with or without the qualification that the same principles they are discussing
apply to written language.
In modern theoretical linguistics, the distinction between spoken and written
form has not as much been taken for granted as disregarded entirely. This is
largely attributable to the competence-performance distinction in generative
linguistics, where ‘competence’ is what the user ‘knows’ about the structure of
the language, as represented in the formal grammar, and ‘performance’ is the
actual use of language and its interaction with situation and language-specific
set of influences (Chomsky 1965: 4). Theoretical syntacticians are concerned
with the sentence as a mental object and the competence involved in generating
these sentences. They regard written and spoken language both as second-order
representations of the same mental forms, and the differences between the two
forms are matters for performance rather than competence. Thus paralinguistic
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features are medium-specific and do not have any ultimate significance for the
formulation of the grammar.
There is opposition to this standpoint: Culler suggests that leaving paralin-
guistic features like intonation contour outside of competence creates a class of
structurally ambiguous sentences - ‘Flying planes can be dangerous’ - that owe
more to a linguistics based on writing (Culler 1987: 174). However, arguments
of this type seem to be based on a misunderstanding of the meaning of ‘com-
petence’ in the generative tradition. These explanations tend to overlook the
finer details of this point in favour of pursuing the writing-speech dichotomy; for
example, intonation contour is not always entirely explicit in speech, and struc-
tural ambiguities still exist in oral language use. The representation of these
paralinguistic features in writing can be just as graduated in their explicitness -
compare ‘Flying planes can be dangerous’ to ‘Flying planes can be dangerous’.
Indeed the disambiguation provided by intonation contour could just as easily
be provided by some other means of demonstration, such as a picture of a plane
crash or the context of a discussion about hazardous activities. The sentence
as a syntactic structure is inherently ambiguous, but the utterance is disam-
biguated by its use in the context. The contribution of these means would be
communicative, and their properties are described by pragmatic theory, such as
Relevance (Sperber & Wilson 1995).
Furthermore, it is highly significant that the majority of humans learn lan-
guages based on experience of spoken language, and written language is only
developed once a basic level of non-written ability has been established. One
of the core assumptions of modern generative linguistics is that learning a lan-
guage involves the setting of basic ‘parameters’ in the child’s mind, based on
spoken experience, and these parameters form the basis for the construction
of the mental grammar that licenses all future language use (Chomsky 1995:
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ch1). As a result, it is generally assumed that reading uses the grammatical
knowledge gained from experience of speech (Perfetti, Landi & Oakhill 2005:
237), and that grammatical interpretation of a sentence involves simply con-
verting the graphological representation into a phonological representation in
the reader’s mind for processing (Fodor 2002)2 . Therefore the relationship be-
tween graphological and grammatical sentences is defined by the ways in which
the written medium represents the paralinguistic features of spoken language. It
should be pointed out that the only paralinguistic features that are relevant to
this discussion are those that contribute to grammatical interpretation, such as
those that aid sentence parsing. In conventional writing systems, these features
are represented by the use of punctuation.
The example of ‘flying planes’ sentences above shows that the representation
of paralinguistic features can be just as graduated in writing as in speech, and
that it has no absolute purpose in written language. This is confirmed by the rel-
atively late development of punctuation in the history of writing. Parkes (1992)
describes how it came into use early in the Medieval Period as Latin scribes
sought to use commas and full stops to make the syntactic and rhetorical struc-
tures of their writing clearer. However, Jajdelska (2007: 57-59) points out that
there is no actual distinction between these different uses of punctuation, and
that both simply instantiate pauses which then aid some kind of interpretation.
2.4 Structural ambiguities in How It Is
What should be taken from this discussion is that punctuation does not create
syntactic relations, but helps to clarify them. Its contribution to interpretation
is a matter of degree, where some styles of punctuating can be characterised as
2This is implicit in the terminology of modern generative linguistics, where Phonological
Form (PF) represents the perceptual interface of language processing (Chomsky 1995: pp).
NB Chomsky concedes that the biases of ‘perceptual’ are for convenience of discussion only,
and makes it clear that he thinks it should be a more general term.
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‘light’ or ‘heavy’ (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 1727). What is certain is that
while How It Is may seem like an extreme example of a lightly punctuated text,
its interpretation is still aided by the use of certain kinds of punctuation, such as
spaces between words and letters, and these conventions allow the reader to dif-
ferentiate word boundaries and breaks in the discourse (like paragraph breaks)
that would be likely to correspond to sentence breaks. This can be compared
with some examples of concrete poetry, where space between words and letters
does not necessarily correspond to relations between parts of language. There-
fore there are grounds for judgments of syntactic relations in How It Is based
on the evidence of punctuation.
The majority of problems that occur as a result of Beckett’s extremely light
punctuation involve difficulty in parsing grammatical constituents in the text.
The reader can have the choice of parsing the text into different sets of phrases
and sentences. Consider the first paragraph of the novel:
(1) how it was I quote before Pim with Pim after Pim how it is three parts
I say it as I hear it
(Beckett 1964: 7.1 )3
There are numerous structural ambiguities within this piece of text alone,
some more obvious than others. For example, one may read the words I quote
as a single sentence inserted parenthetically within the main sentence how it
was. . . before Pim; alternatively, one may interpret how it was as a sentence and
I quote before Pim as a separate constituent (i.e. with before Pim as an adjunct
to the verb quote). In this case, the grounds for making judgments of which
structure is preferable involve considering the appropriateness, or relevance,
of the resulting utterance. Regardless of arguments for one interpretation or
another, the text remains structurally ambiguous. Structural ambiguity of this
3Page 7, paragraph 1. From hereon all references are to the Grove Press edition, in the
form page no/paragraph.
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type could arise in oral use, and it is neither exclusive to this kind of writing
nor an indication of deviant language use.
That is not to say that the proliferation of structural ambiguities is not
important to the formal character of How It Is, as the constant availability of
multiple interpretation makes the text complex and often difficult to read. How-
ever, this tendency for structural ambiguity is for the most part a product of
Beckett’s style of punctuation, and the effect of punctuation is explained by a
theory of communication, such as pragmatics, rather than a theory of grammar.
Thus one might consider how Beckett’s refusal to show clear sentence structures
deliberately flouts Grice’s communicative maxim ‘be orderly’ (Grice 1975), and
therefore communicates a variety of meanings relating to the ambiguity of lan-
guage (all of which may be appropriate in a reading of this text). However,
this dissertation is not concerned with the kinds of communicative choices that
Beckett makes, but the sentence structures that are made possible by his exper-
imental practice, so I will have little to say about the communicative import of
structural ambiguities.
What is important is that, in the cases described above, the structure of
the text is ambiguous because there is a lack of syntactic evidence to indicate
one specific interpretation over the other. But this is not always the case in
the text, despite the lack of punctuation, as often the constituency of phrases
is indicated clearly by the reader’s knowledge of basic grammatical principles
such as phrase structure rules or verbal inflection. For example, in the section
quoted above, no speaker of English would fail to recognise that the sequence
before Pim with Pim after Pim is a series of three preposition phrases, and none
would recognise Pim with as a constituent. Few would argue that how it was
I quote is a constituent, as the tense of the embedded clause I quote does not
agree with the matrix verb, and in most versions of English the embedded clause
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would need to be preceded by an overt complementizer that (thus how it was
that I quoted. . . ). Generally, there are a variety of easy decisions for the reader
to make when assigning structures to the text.
It is less simple when the text seems to be very unusual or ungrammatical.
Consider this example, also from the first page:
(2) in me that were without when the panting stops scraps of an ancient
voice in me not mine (7.4)
It is not clear how one might interpret the first few words in this text: in
me that were without. It seems that in me is a preposition phrase, and in
that were without is a complementizer phrase headed by that containing the
past tense plural form of to be. Given that the complementizer constructions of
this kind are normally embedded in a matrix sentence or phrase (i.e. To them
that were without the law), one could argue that in me that were without is
a constituent. However, this is still an unusual constituent, and it is difficult
to ascertain its meaning or paraphrase in this context. It appears that there
is gapping within the complementizer clause; that is, the preposition phrase
without has an understood (nominal) complement, coindexed to the matrix
pronoun me (i.e. I hear voices in me that were without [me]); otherwise, the
preposition is ‘stranded’ and the structure is ill-formed and even less coherent
than the alternative. But this is clearly an unusual and strange constituent, in
that the interpretation of this structure is difficult given that the matrix clause
is not fully formed.
Why, then, should we take in me that were without to be a constituent?
After all, in this text it appears that there is relative freedom in the selection
of constituent structures, and a reader who knows English knows that certain
sequences of words do not form constituents. However, the point in this case
is that the unusual constituent analysis is the most plausible option available.
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For example, the interpretation of gapping in the preposition phrase may have
yielded an unusual and semantically strange interpretation, but the alternative
reading - where without is a stranded preposition - was ungrammatical. It seems
that, in dealing with unusual pieces of text such as this, the question of degrees
of grammaticality is important, and that the reader would tend to take the most
grammatical interpretation of the text at hand.
From this discussion, we can formulate a principle regarding the analysis of
deviant structures:
Principle A: in analysing deviant structures in a text, the deviant
structure should still be the most likely (or grammatical) interpre-
tation available.
This constitutes an important hypothesis about the way in which readers
interpret difficult or ungrammatical constituents, as otherwise there is no way
to attest that a text can be read as anything other than a collection of its
smallest autonomous constituents, not combined in syntactic structures. This
would be a counter-intuitive reading strategy for any native user of English.
However, it is not clear why it should be the case that a reader should interpret
the largest structure. On the one hand, this seems to be an operation of the
mental grammar, parsing and interpreting the largest legible syntactic structure,
but there is no theoretical apparatus in modern linguistics to account for such a
selection process. On the other hand, this does seem to resemble the cognitive
strategies described by Relevance theory, where the communicator takes the
meaning of an utterance to be the one most likely intended based on the context.
This issue is vital to the discussion of the syntax-pragmatics interface, and I will
return to these issues in later discussions. For now, I will take the hypothesis
to be true, in lieu of its full explanation.
CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL ISSUES: READING HOW IT IS 22
2.5 Experimental style in How It Is
2.5.1 ‘Chunking’ and reading strategies
It should be clear from the above that, while the lack of punctuation is striking
and creates many difficulties for reading the text, it is not the only aspect of
the text’s style which can be termed Experimental. Another important stylis-
tic feature of How It Is is its tendency towards fragmentation, or ‘chunking’.
This term is used in preference to the term ‘fragmentation’, as the latter has
many varying technical uses in linguistics literature. Here ‘chunking’ is used
to describe the style of writing, where Beckett uses small pieces of language -
phrases, clauses, small sentences or fragments - and puts them together without
concern for explicit syntactic relations between the chunks. Throughout the
novel the text is filled with phrases and clauses which do not appear to belong
to a sentence, often appearing in lists with no explicit syntactic connections in
between. To illustrate this point we can look at the second paragraph:
(3) voice once without quaqua on all sides then in me when the panting
stops tell me again finish telling me invocation (7.2)
In this section, there are two discernible grammatical sentences, tell me again
and finish telling me, both of which are in the imperative mood. The rest of
the text is a collection of phrases without any main clauses and few verbs, and
one reading may assign the constituency of the phrases thus:
(4) [voice] [once without] [quaqua on all sides] [then in me] [when the panting
stops] [tell me again] [finish telling me] [invocation]
It should be noted that the constituent when the panting stops could be
contained within the sentence tell me again as a subordinate clause in the ini-
tial position, but it is not under this particular analysis. This may seem to go
against the hypothesis stated above, where the most grammatical reading avail-
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able should be taken; in this case, reading the two clauses as related would yield
a full grammatical sentence rather than a sentence and an uncontrolled subor-
dinate clause. However, the phrase when the panting stops is used consistently
throughout the text, often without relation to adjacent constituents:
(5) in me that were without when the panting stops scraps of an ancient
voice (7.4)
(6) this voice is truly changeable of which so little left in me bits and scraps
barely audible when the panting stops so little so faint (15.2)
(7) this voice once quaqua then in me when the panting stops part three
after Pim (20.2)
(8) all life part one before Pim how it was leaving only with Pim how it was
leaving only after Pim how it was how it is when the panting stops bits
and scraps I wake off I go (24.3)
The repeated use of specific phrases and sentences is one of the most striking
stylistic features of How It Is, and their repeated use can produce certain reading
strategies throughout (Zwaan 1993). That is, once one reads a construction used
in a certain way enough times, it becomes partially ‘lexicalised’ and is read in
this manner throughout the text.
There are two caveats on this point. The first is that reading strategies may
not account for the above example of when the panting stops, as this example
occurs in the second paragraph of the novel, when the constituent is yet to be
‘lexicalised’. The second caveat relates to the first: although reading strategies
are well attested in the relevant literature, they cannot be formalised in the same
way as other discourse features (such as discourse markers), and may only apply
for certain readers or readings, as seen in this example. Nevertheless, some of
the repetitions which occur in How It Is are so persistent that these reading
strategies seem relevant to any discussion of the novel’s formal character.
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The use of these repeated phrases in this manner is one of the most obvious
aspects of the ‘chunking’ of the text, where the constituents, which could some-
times join with adjacent constituents to form larger ones, are moved around the
text as autonomous objects. Consider the use of the clause how it was in Part
One:
(9) here then part one how it was before Pim with Pim after Pim (7.1)
(10) here then part one how it was before Pim we follow (7.7)
(11) the images part one how it was before Pim I see them in the mud (10.5)
(12) false that old time part one how it was before Pim vast stretch of time
(16.6)
(13) part two with Pim how it was leaving then leaving only part three after
Pim how it was (16.10)
(14) I am in part three after Pim how it was how it is (20.2)
(15) how it was before Pim first say that (24.3)
(16) all life part one before Pim how it was leaving only with Pim how it was
leaving only after Pim how it was how it is when the panting stops (24.3)
(17) more or less part one before Pim how it was things so ancient the journey
(27.2)
(18) my traveling days part one before Pim how it was leaving only part two
(37.4)
(19) my travelling days before Pim part one how it was before the others the
sedentary with Pim after Pim how it was how it is vast tracts of time
(39.3)
(20) end of part one before Pim that’s how it was before Pim (48.4)
CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL ISSUES: READING HOW IT IS 25
What is striking is that in almost all of the examples, how it was is placed
next to part one and before Pim (or a similar PP) in varying combinations,
without regard for syntax. The only combination of elements that would yield
a syntactic object is how it was before Pim, and this occurs as frequently as
the other combinations. Looking at this pattern, it seems that the combination
of these constituents is not necessarily led by the need to create well-formed
sentences; rather, they are moved around as chunks of language which combine
syntactically in some instances.
A similar pattern can be seen with the other stock phrases that persist in
the novel, such as bits and scraps:
(21) last state last version what remains bits and scraps I hear it (7.7)
(22) so little left in me bits and scraps barely audible (15.2)
(23) I hear it natural order more or less bits and scraps in the mud (20.2)
(24) after Pim how it is my life bits and scraps (20.3)
(25) all that in the present barely audible bits and scraps (20.4)
(26) when the panting stops bits and scraps I wake off I go my day my life
part one bits and scraps (24.3)
(27) the very beginning bits and scraps I come back to me (25.6)
(28) when the panting stops bits and scraps I murmur them (39.3)
(29) when the panting stops barely audible bits and scraps (47.4)
The same can be seen with the repetition of other constituents, some of which
recur with great frequency throughout the text. To give an indication of the
amount of this repetition, Appendix A provides a list of the most common stock
CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL ISSUES: READING HOW IT IS 26
phrases and their occurrences in the first section of the novel. It is interesting
to note that some of the repeated constituents are quite complex, such as I say
it as I hear it, or brief movements of the lower face. The chunking of text does
not just apply to small phrases but also to larger constituents.
Related to the repetition of constituents throughout the text, there are also
many examples of local repetition, or parallelism. As mentioned above, syntactic
parallelism is a common formal feature throughout the literatures of the world,
but it resists formalism just like reading strategies. Parallelism functions in
a similar manner, encouraging the reader to parse the text in a manner that
preserves the repeated phrases instead of other combinations.
It is arguable whether this kind of chunking of text leads the reader to
interpret the texts in certain ways. In all the cases of structural ambiguity
where the parallelism and stock phrases seem to indicate a specific reading, the
structural ambiguity remains and the form of the text is not affected. However,
the main point here is that this chunking is not as much significant because
of the ways in which is dictates reading, but the ways in which this approach
to writing can affect form. That is, when pieces of text are placed together
and moved about as chunks, disregarding the syntactic combination of these
chunks, the resulting text can be incoherent and ungrammatical. The problems
experienced from this style will be investigated in the next two chapters.
2.5.2 The contribution of spoken forms of language
This ‘chunking’ style continues throughout the text, and it is one of the most
distinctive features of How It Is. But why is the text written in this way? One
explanation is that the text is written in the style of spoken language. It is often
remarked that Beckett was trying to “reduce everything to a voice speaking in
the eternal present” (Dearlove 1986: 102), and throughout the novel there are
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repeated references to the narration specifically as a spoken one. It is true
that fragmentation of this kind is more characteristic of spoken than written
discourse (Biber 1988: 21), and it often appears that the fragmentation in How
It Is is of the kind found in spoken discourse. For example, there are a great
number of self-corrections:
(30) I remember when appetite revives or I forget open another
it’s one or the other (8.6)
(31) an image the kind I see sometimes see in the mud (11.2)
(32) the tins the opener the cord but the wish for something else
no that doesn’t seem to have been given to me (11.8)
There is frequent meta-commentary, reflecting on what is said in the act of
speech:
(33) I pissed and shat another image in my crib (9.6)
(34) I see me now on my side I clutch it the sack we’re talking of the sack
(10.2)
(35) It’s a resource when all fails images dreams sleep food for thought
something wrong there (14.3)
There are also vocal interjections like ‘ah’, ‘aha’ and ‘oh’:
(36) ah my young friend this sack
(37) before things got out of hand satisfactory ah the soul I had in those days
(38) once is enough aha signifying mamma
(39) at this instant I never so oh I know happiness
However, it should be emphasised that whether the text is written in the style
of spoken language is an empirical question, where the “textual dimensions” of
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spoken language would be a matter for statistical analysis of the kind found
in Biber (1988). This would involve analysing discourse features such as those
mentioned above, but also tendencies in grammatical constructions (such as the
use of complex nominalizations) and functional-grammatical categories (such
as ‘situated reference’). This kind of analysis lies outside of this study, and
will not be pursued. Nevertheless, it is important to note that this kind of
work reveals different tendencies in the perception of grammaticality in the two
kinds of language; Miller (2006: 681) states that spontaneous speech allows
certain kinds of unintegrated syntax which are not found in corpora of written
language. Since the style of the Beckett text have a demonstrable spoken flavour,
the apparent ungrammaticality of some of the texts in Beckett’s work may be
explained by appealing to a definition of grammaticality that includes spoken
forms.
2.5.3 Aspects of ‘chunking’: comparisons with other texts
Before moving onto the analysis, it is important to clarify a few points about the
chunking in the text. The first point is that it is a deliberate stylistic feature
of the text rather than an accident of putting text together at random. To
illustrate the latter point, we can look at two texts from the same period as
How It Is that employ aleatory techniques. William S. Burroughs was one of
the most famous authors to embrace chance as a methodology for writing, using
a ‘cut-up’ method to compose many of his works. The following example is from
Nova Express:
So many years - that image - got up and fixed in the sick dawn - No
me hagas caso - Again he touched like that - smell of dust - the tears
gathered - In Mexico again he touched - Codeine pills powdered out
into the cold Spring air - Cigarette holes in the vast Thing Police -
Could give me no information other than wind identity fading out
- dwindling - “Mr Martin” couldn’t reach is all - Bread knife in the
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heart - Shadow turned off the lights and water [. . . ]
(Burroughs 1968: 29)
In this text dashes are used throughout to separate pieces of text which
have presumably been pieced together by chance operations. There are two
interesting features to note in this text. First, many of these separate pieces
seem ill-formed or incomplete, such as “In Mexico again he touched” and “Could
give me no information other than wind identity fading out”. Second, it is often
very difficult for the reader to read the text as a coherent discourse, as there
seems to be little connection between many of the demarcated fragments. As
a result, it is uncertain whether there is a single narrative voice or any specific
situation being described.
Another writer who used chance operations in much of his writing is John
Cage. This example is from ‘Mureau’:
sparrowsitA gROsbeak betrays itself by that peculiar squeakariEF-
FECT OF SLIGHTEST tinkling measures soundness ingplease We
hear! Does it not rather hear us? sWhen he hears the telegraph, he
thinksthose bugs have issued forthThe owl touches die stops, wakes
reverberations d qwalky In verse there is no inherent music
(Cage 1973: 35)
Both of the features seen in Nova Express are even more obvious in this text.
In particular there are few well-formed constituents, and the chance operation
seems to affect some word structures as well as the ordering of constituents,
producing a text which is often completely incomprehensible. The contrast
with Beckett’s text should be clear, as even in the most difficult passages of
How It Is it is possible to identify constituents and discourse relations between
the pieces:
(40) and yet a dream I am given a dream like someone having tasted of love
of a little woman within my reach and dreaming too it’s in the dream
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too of a little man within hers I have than in my life this time sometimes
part one as I journey (13.6)
(41) this voice once quaqua then in me when the panting stops part three
after Pim not before not with I have journeyed found Pim lost Pim it is
over I am in part three after Pim how it was how it is I say it as I hear
it natural order more or less bits and scraps in the mud my life murmur
it to the mud (20.2)
There are many difficulties in these sections, but in both cases there are
relatively few problems in identifying chunks of texts, and these chunks can
usually cohere in some meaningful way in the context. While Burroughs’ and
Cage’s texts use chunks of text like How It Is, there is a marked difference
between the chance texts and Beckett’s text. While it can appear that chunks
of texts are simply stuck together without reason, they still cohere as part of a
narrative text and the meaning of the discourse is not completely indeterminate.
The difference between the experience of reading the texts that has its root in
this issue of indeterminacy. With ‘Mureau’, the text is not to be read as a clear
narrative with cohesive relations between the disparate chunks. Rather, the
text is read as a disparate collection of pieces of language, where the aesthetic
experience of abnormal forms and juxtaposed meanings is prioritised above the
need to infer meaningful relations between the parts. There is a similar experi-
ence in the most heavily cut-up sections of Nova Express and Burroughs’ other
works. For both Burroughs and Cage, indeterminacy was a way of escaping the
constraints of language 4; this is manifested in the style of their writing, and the
corresponding experience of the reader is one where all emergent meanings are
in some way accidental. Meaningful relations between chunks are more likely to
be interpreted as ‘associations’ than connections in a discourse.
This contrasts greatly with Beckett’s work: while the aesthetic experience of
the chopped-up style and light punctuation is important to the text as a whole, it
4Cage 1973: ii; Burroughs in ‘The Electronic Revolution’ (Internet 1).
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does not override the need to create a coherent, determinate discourse from the
disparate text. Throughout How It Is it is apparent that there is one narrative
voice, and that each of the disparate chunks of text should be understood as part
of a single discourse, even if that single discourse is continually undermined by
moments of incoherence. This is characteristic of Beckett’s attitude to writing:
while he believed that language was inadequate for true expression, he felt
that the goal of writing was not to free itself from language entirely, as with
Burroughs and Cage, but to misuse it with intent. He expressed this clearly in
the famous ‘German letter’ to his friend Axel Kaun in 1937:
Let us hope the time will come. . . when language is most efficiently
used where it is being most efficiently misused. As we cannot elim-
inate language all at once, we should at least leave nothing undone
that might contribute to its falling into disrepute. To bore one hole
after another in it, until what lurks behind it - be it something or
nothing - begins to seep through; I cannot imagine a higher goal for
a writer today.
(Beckett 2001: 171-172)
This deliberate treatment of language is apparent in the experience of reading
How It Is, and this is important as otherwise the ‘misuse’ of language would
be interpreted as an accident of a procedure and not as a style of writing.
This may be explained in terms of Relevance theory: the reader identifies the
fact that the text is a piece of ostensive communication, and interprets the
communication by considering its Relevance. If the ostention is diminished, the
expectation of Relevance is reduced and the reader is less likely to work to make
the communication Relevant. Thus if the style is clearly deliberate, the reader
will make more effort to understand the peculiarities that the style may exhibit.
The second point about the chunking of How It Is is that the size of the
pieces of text is of great significance. The main reason for using the term
‘chunking’ (or ‘fragmentation’) to describe the style is to capture the fact that
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the pieces of text are not simply full sentences, but rather small pieces and
fragments of sentences. A great deal of the problems in the text (which are to
be analysed in the following sections) would not occur if the pieces assembled
in the unpunctuated text were full sentences. This can be demonstrated by
comparison with another near-contemporary example, the ‘Penelope’ section of
James Joyce’s Ulysses:
Yes because he never did a thing like that before as ask to get his
breakfast in bed with a couple of eggs since the City arms hotel
when he used to be pretending to be laid up with a sick voice do-
ing his highness to make himself interesting to that old faggot Mrs
Riordan that he thought he had a great leg of and she never left us
a farthing all for masses for herself and her soul greatest miser ever
was actually afraid to lay out 4d for her methylated spirit telling me
all her ailments she had too much old chat in her about politics and
earthquakes and the end of the world let us have a bit of fun first
(Joyce 1999: 690)
In this section there are few problems in parsing the text into separate ut-
terances, as the breaks between full sentences are obvious. There are a few
non-sentential constituents (in bold), but these are just as clearly demarcated:
[Yes because he never did a thing like that before as ask to get his
breakfast in bed with a couple of eggs since the City arms hotel when
he used to be pretending to be laid up with a sick voice doing his
highness to make himself interesting to that old faggot Mrs Riordan]
[that he thought he had a great leg of and she never left us a farthing]
[all for masses] [for herself and her soul] [greatest miser ever
was] [actually afraid to lay out 4d for her methylated spirit] [telling
me all her ailments] [she had too much old chat in her] [about politics
and earthquakes and the end of the world] [let us have a bit of fun
first]
There are no major structural ambiguities of the kind seen in examples from
How It Is (see section 2.5), and no instances of ungrammaticality of illegibility
as a result of the unpunctuated style.
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It is well attested in the critical literature (Wales 1992; Kumar 1963) that
the lack of punctuation, long meandering sentences and dialectal vocabulary
is used to represent the character Molly Bloom’s thoughts as a stream of con-
sciousness. While the associative jumps from one thought to another provide a
suitably disjointed narrative, the language of the text is largely understandable
and grammatical. This is in great contrast to How It Is, where ambiguities in
sentence structure, apparently ungrammatical utterances and incoherent jux-
taposition of small chunks of text can create many difficulties for the reader.
Both texts share many characteristics, such as use of spoken forms of language,
but the main difference between them - the size of the constituents placed to-
gether in the unpunctuated text - seems to account for the large differences in
their legibility. This may be because there are much more constituents in a
smaller space in Beckett’s style, and hence there are more possibilities of con-
trasts or ambiguities. Regardless, it seems clear that Beckett’s Experimental
style - deliberate chunking of a text into small pieces, without punctuation -
produces many difficulties that are not present in most texts, without becoming
completely illegible or incoherent.
2.6 Summary
This section has explored some of the key concepts behind a literary linguistic
investigation into experimental literature. The discussion of grammaticality
and the written sentence highlights some of the formal properties of written
sentences, specifically how they relate to the mental grammar. The discussion of
the experimental style of Beckett’s How It Is indicates that the text seems to be
composed in ‘chunks’, and that many peculiarities of the text can be explained
by this way of manipulating language. In the following chapter, I examine some
specific kinds of linguistic deviation in the text, and I will consider whether
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these deviations are produced by this experimental style.
Chapter 3
How It Is: description and
analysis
3.1 Introduction
This chapter identifies kinds of linguistic deviation in the text of How It Is,
considering how they may be produced and why they are deviant. The regularity
of some kinds of deviation is one of the most interesting aspects of the text,
and it is interesting to consider why some kinds of deviation occur throughout,
as this might indicate what effects stylistic experimentation have on linguistic
structure. It should be noted that all evidence from How It Is comes from the
first section (p7-48), as the analysis was concentrated on this section for the
sake of focus. All of the regular trends identified can be found throughout the
text.
35
CHAPTER 3. HOW IT IS: DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 36
3.2 Unproblematic structures
Before describing the difficulties that occur in How It Is, it is important to
reiterate that it is not an entirely unstable text. Rather, reading the text can
be deceptively simple in places. Indeed one of the most interesting features of
the language of the text is that, despite the problems caused by the style, it
is still possible to discern a great number of relatively complex sentences. For
example, there are right-dislocated objects:
(42) I scissored into slender strips the wings of butterflies (9.7)
(43) I leave for the moment life in the light (9.8)
There are sentences with complex embedding:
(44) that doesn’t seem to have been put in my life this time (11.8)
(45) the huge head hatted with birds and flowers is bowed down over my
curls (15.7)
(46) others knowing nothing of my beginnings save what they could glean by
hearsay or in public records (12.6)
(47) others who had always known me here in my last place they talk to me
of themselves of me perhaps too in the end (12.7)
(48) others finally who do not know me yet they pass with heavy tread mur-
muring to themselves they have sought refuge in a desert place to be
alone at last and vent their sorrows unheard (13.1)
These last three sentences are of particular interest. They occur in succession
as a set of parallel structures, with a sequential elaboration that leads to a
progressive increase in complexity. The three sentences all have the same general
structure of NP[Embedded clause]VP, but the second and third sentences exhibit
the unintegrated syntax of unplanned speech described by Miller (2006), in
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that the subject of the matrix sentence is repeated pronominally following the
embedded relative clause; cf Miller’s example “this older woman in the class she
likes to kid us all on” (Miller 2006: 683). It is important that this only occurs in
the two more complex sentences, with embedded relative clauses rather than the
shorter gerundial sentence of the first example; this is consistent with Miller’s
assertion that this kind of unintegrated use arises in order to make the text
easier to comprehend.
These examples are interesting for two reasons. First, the example shows
that consideration of spoken forms of English is important, as in this case it
allows for a principled explanation of a form which may be considered deviant
by more restrictive standards. Second, this kind of case is important to studies
of syntax, as it appears that it can also be explained by appealing to pragmatic
theory. Miller argues that this kind of construction is an instance of uninte-
grated syntax, and this implies that the reference between the initial subject
(others) and the verb-adjacent subject (they) is bound. However, the alter-
native pragmatic-based explanation is that the initial subject and embedded
clause are not part of a single syntactic construction but independent clauses
in the discourse. In this case, the interpretation of co-reference between oth-
ers and they could be explained by communicative principles like Relevance.
Choosing the correct explanation is a matter for detailed study, but it is impor-
tant to realise that cases like these are at the “edges of syntax”, where it is less
clear whether certain constructions are formal, generated by the grammar, or
functional, arising from the use in communication.
The general question raised by this example is whether phrases (or clauses)
should be treated as separate objects in the discourse or as part of unified
syntactic objects. This is uncontroversial in some cases, such as the right-
dislocated sentences above. In these sentences, the prepositional phrases are in
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non-canonical positions but their relation to the verb is perfectly clear. Thus
with the sentence I leave for the moment life in the light it is clear that for the
moment is a modification of the verb phrase leave life in the light ; it may be
moved for emphasis, or to remove the ambiguity of I leave life in the light for the
moment. There are also phrases or clauses in non-canonical positions which are
clearly not syntactically related to the main sentences, such as parentheticals:
(49) we follow I quote the natural order (7.7)
(50) close my eyes not the blue the others at the back and see me on my face
(8.8)
(51) I pissed and shat another image in my crib (9.6)1
However, in a large amount of other cases it is not clear whether syntactic
relations hold between constituents, and throughout the text there are many ex-
amples of fragments which can seem very strange as a result of these ambiguous
relations.
3.3 Conjunction
3.3.1 Evidence
One of the most common sources of this kind of ambiguity is conjunction. Much
of the text is made up of small sentences and discrete phrases placed together,
but there are also a lot of instances of inter-constituent linkage. In many cases
this is unproblematic, producing sentences that are well formed and sometimes
complex:
1It is worth noting that some readers may take another image to be the object of the
transitive verbs-in-apposition pissed and shat, given the text’s penchant for odd situations;
however, a reader of How It Is is unlikely to take this interpretation, as another image is an
example of one of the ‘stock phrases’ described above, and is more likely to be taken as a
parenthetical than any of the other possible constructions.
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(52) I’m not deceived or I am it all depends on what is not said (37.7)
(53) . . . beginning with the sponges when suddenly I can’t stay a second
longer (38.7)
(54) scoop my wallow and stir from it no more (39.2)
(55) as when exceptionally the worse for drink at the small hour of the
garbage-man in my determination to leave the elevator I caught my
foot twixt cage and landing and two hours later to the tick someone
came running having summoned it in vain (37.6)
In all of these examples, the syntactic and semantic functions of the con-
junctions are standard. All join clauses or phrases together into single syntactic
objects; when in 53, as in 55 are subordinating conjunctions, contained within
the main clauses. Or in 52 licenses contrastive constructions; as in 55 implies
causality; when in 53 and and in 54 and 55 imply temporal relations. These
constructions are matched by appropriate relations between the conjoined con-
stituents, such as the contrast of negation linked by the or in 52.
However, the majority of cases in How It Is are less well behaved. Consider
the following sample:
(56) I close my eyes something is lacking whereas normally closed or open
(14.6)
(57) centuries I can see me quite tiny the same as now more or less only tinier
quite tiny no more objects no more food and I live the air sustains me
the mud I live on (17.7)
(58) a fancy I am given a fancy the panting stops and a breathclock breath
of life head in the bag (19.7)
(59) enough indeed nearly enough when you come to think of it to make you
laugh feel yourself falling and on with a squeak brief movements of the
lower face no sound if you could come to think of it (26.3)
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(60) passing time is told to me and time past vast tracts of time the panting
stops and scraps of an enormous tale as heard so murmured to this mud
which is told to me natural order (27.1)
(61) only one remedy then pull it in and suck it swallow the mud or spit it
out it’s one or the other and question is it nourishing and vistas last a
moment with that (28.2)
(62) I part the mouth of the sack and questions what my God can I desire
what hunger to eat what was my last meal (33.5)
(63) if I was born it was not left-handed (35.6)
(64) and the day so near its end if it is not compact of a thousand days (39.6)
(65) wake up in a sweat and have met Jesus in a dream (45.5)
The unusual uses of conjunctions here can be grouped into two specific ten-
dencies. First, there is the use of whereas and or in 56, if in 59, 63 and 6, where
the semantic content of the conjunctions are not matched by the combination
of constituents. For example, the uses of if produce complementizer phrases
in the conditional voice, but the constituents do not contain propositions that
exhibit conditional relations. In 59, there are three constituents that could be
read as conjoined by if : to the left, the phrases no sound and movements of the
lower face (with no sound as a parenthetical); following the CP on the right, the
clause of what you nearly lost. But none of these constituents are sentences and
none of them bear the sufficient propositional content to license a conditional
relation to the CP. There is a similar mismatch between semantic content and
the combination of constituents with whereas and or in 56.
The second unusual tendency in conjunction use is the coordination with and
in the other examples above, which persists throughout the text. Huddleston
& Pullum (2002: 1290) state that coordination is subject to a condition of
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‘syntactic likeness’, where constituents can only be coordinated if they share a
functional likeness (hence expressions like *He left the country and this morning
are not acceptable). Thus 57 involves the conjunction of the NP no more food
to the sentence I live, and most of the other examples above involve the same
problem. 65 involves the conjunction of the sentence wake up in a sweat to the
fragment have met Jesus in a dream; this does not work as there is no covert
referent for the PRO subject of the second clause, because the first clause is
in imperative and has an understood subject (such as ‘you’). Have is in its
auxiliary form normally cannot take a null-specifier imperative form like lexical
verbs (such as wake or possessive have), but in some usages this is acceptable, in
diary or letter writing for example (eg %Have been working hard this week and
haven’t had the chance to reply). The ungrammaticality of the conjoined text
arises from the combination of the non-identity between the clauses; however,
it is unclear whether this arises from the functional difference between the two
clauses (imperative vs declarative) or their differing grammatical status.
3.3.2 Discussion
These problems with conjunction are prevalent throughout the text, but it is
not clear why this is the case. One explanation may be that this is a result of the
text’s effort to represent spoken language. Discontinuities in inter-clausal con-
nection are common in spoken language; in fact, some linguists believe that the
clause is the maximal unit of spoken language, rather than the sentence, given
that the connections between clauses are so frequently abused in speech (Miller
& Weinert 1998: ch.2). Regardless of this debate, it seems that this analysis is
not relevant to the example of How It Is. There are several examples of sentences
which are so long and complex that it is doubtful that they could belong to the
same spoken description, such as example 55 and some of the examples of com-
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plex embedding and movement identified above. The spoken-written dichotomy
is useful for explaining the appearance of certain non-standard constructions,
such as the examples of ‘unintegrated syntax’ described above, but it does not
give a principled explanation for the kinds of errors which appear in examples
56-65; indeed most of these examples would be identified as ungrammatical in
spoken use, and would be just as unlikely to occur in either medium.
Alternatively, it could be argued that it is the Experimental style that pro-
duces these errors. It has been argued that Beckett’s Experimentation has two
main manifestations in the language of the text, the lack of punctuation, and the
chunking of the text. The lack of punctuation does not impact on the forms of
the text in themselves, but simply on their interpretation, and is not relevant to
this particular case. However, the chunking of the kind seen throughout How It
Is is important to the forms of the text, as it leads to a great amount of phrases
and clauses which have no syntactic connection to their adjacent constituents.
In this context, it is arguable that the tendency towards ungrammatical use
of conjunction is a result of this chunking. In the majority of cases Beckett’s
chunking only affects the coherence of the discourse, where the lack of explicit
connection between lists of phrases makes the text unorderly; in such cases, he
disregards communicative maxims such as ‘be orderly’. However, in the exam-
ples of conjunction above, chunks of text are placed together within sentences by
means of conjunction, and sentences are subject to tighter, formal constraints.
Beckett disregards rules about the combination of clauses, and produces un-
grammatical utterances.
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3.4 Adverbs and parentheticals
3.4.1 Adverbs: general characteristics
Another common feature of the text of How It Is is the unusual use of ad-
verbs and adverb phrases. These constituents are used frequently throughout
the novel, and this is not surprising considering the style in which it is writ-
ten. Adverbs and adverbials typically modify verb phrases, as adjuncts, but
they can also appear as disjunct sentential adverbs. Disjunct adverbials appear
to be attached to sentences by syntactic relations, based on graphological and
tonic representations, as in Personally I don’t know what you’re on about. How-
ever these constituents have been shown to function much like other disjunct
constituents, attaching to the host sentence by pragmatic rather than syntactic
means (Blakemore 2006; Burton-Roberts 1998). As a result these constituents
are not constrained tightly and can enjoy relatively free distribution in discourse.
In addition, adverbs and adverb phrases also exhibit relatively free distribu-
tion across sentences. Consider the sentence He pushed the piano through the
door as modified by the adverb quickly :
He quickly pushed the piano through the door.
He pushed the piano quickly through the door.
He pushed the piano through the door quickly.
However, it is important to note that adverbs do not have completely free
distribution, as they can only appear as adjuncts at phrase boundaries, hence
the unacceptability of *He pushed the piano through quickly the door, where
the adverb appears within the preposition phrase through the door. Individual
adverbs also show distributional restrictions; Radford (1997: 142-144) explains
that some adverbs like completely only appear in verb phrases (VPs), but not
in inflectional phrases (IPs)2, and vice versa:
2Inflectional Phrases are relatively new to the technical literature on syntax, coming into
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They certainly have [ignored her completely ]V P
They certainly have [completely ignored her]V P
*They completely have [certainly ignored her]V P
*They completely have [ignored her certainly]V P
(from Radford 1997: 142)3
Thus according to Radford’s analysis, completely is an IP-adverb and cer-
tainly a VP-adverb. Many adverbs can take both positions, such as quickly in
the above examples, and some of these distributional tendencies can often be
described in terms of semantic relations: for example, epistemic adverbs like
certainly or definitely tend to be IP-adverbs. In summary, the distribution of
adverbials within sentences is limited in many cases, so there may be difficul-
ties with interpretation if they are distributed through sentences without some
regard for grammatical structure.
3.4.2 Adverbs: evidence
In many cases, the use of adverbs and adverb phrases in How It Is is wholly
conventional:
(66) you are in the dark the mud and on you suddenly a hand like yours on
Pim (23.5)
(67) you will have a little voice it will be barely audible (23.6)
(68) what cannot as much be said could not as much be always said my little
host (34.4)
common use with the arrival of Government and Binding Theory in the 1980s Chomsky 1980,
and they describe tensed auxiliary VPs or infinitival to phrases. See the relevant discussion
in Radford (1997).
3The analysis of certainly as an IP-adverb may seem inaccurate here, since it can occur
in the sentence They have certainly ignored her where certainly appears to modify the VP.
Radford’s analysis assumes that an adverb can only be a VP-adverb if it can take up all the
possible positions in the VP, and the evidence shows that *They have ignored her certainly
is unacceptable for this reason.
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(69) as when exceptionally the worse for drink at the small hour. . . (37.6)
(70) I go on zigzag give me my due conformably to my complexion present
formulation (46.7-47.1)
In the examples above, the adverbs are unproblematic, even when there are
other problems with the related structures. In 66 it is not entirely clear which
phrase the adverb suddenly may modify, but it is uncontroversial that the use
is grammatical and easily interpreted, as the adverb is between the two distinct
phrases on you and a hand. In 69 the adverb appears to modify a noun phrase as
it is directly followed by a definite article the (not normally allowed in English
cf *completely the idiot), but the following construction is a grammaticalised
adjectival phrase the worse for wear, and there is no problem in interpreting
this as a well-formed phrase for any reader of English.
However there are also many examples of adverbs which are more problem-
atic. Since adverbs enjoy relatively free distribution in discourse, it is often
unclear whether they are syntactically related to adjacent constituents, or in-
dependent utterances which appear parenthetically:
(71) question if other inhabitants here with me yes or no obviously all-
important most important and thereupon long wrangle so minute that
moments when yes to be feared till finally conclusion no me sole elect the
panting stops and that is all I hear barely hear the question the answer
barely audible if other inhabitants besides me here with me for good in
the dark the mud long wrangle all lost and finally conclusion no me sole
elect (13.5)
(72) my memory obviously the panting stops and question of my memory
obviously that too all-important most important this voice is truly
changeable of which so little left in me (15.2)
(73) I’ll fall asleep within humanity again just barely (44.7-45.1)
In some cases, the adverbs appear adjacent to nominals to which they cannot
be adjoined: in 71, finally conclusion occurs twice; in 72, obviously that too.
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However, these examples are not difficult to interpret, and the adverbs do not
modify the adjacent nominals as if they were adjectives. In till finally conclusion,
adding a definite article to the nominal would yield till finally the conclusion,
whereas if the adverb formed a constituent with the nominal this would produce
*till the finally conclusion (cf till the final conclusion). Therefore the adverbs
are independent of the nominals in these cases, and the constituents are not
ill-formed. The actual function of the adverbs is not entirely clear, as they
could be taken as modifiers for elided verbs (till finally there is conclusion) or
as unrelated units in the discourse (like exclamations).
3.4.3 Adverbs of parentheticals?
In most of the other unusual examples, the adverbs do not seem to have any
direct syntactic relation to the adjacent constituent. In barely audible in 71 and
just barely in 73, the adverbs form constituents with the adjacent words, but
these constituents (an AP and an AvP respectively) are not contained within a
clause or sentence, and appear as discrete phrases or fragments in the discourse.
The AP barely audible recurs in this manner consistently:
(74) I would feel it and brief apostil barely audible not made not really for
happiness (18.7)
(75) the day can begin these scraps barely audible of a fantasy (19.7)
(76) the couple the abandon all that in the present barely audible bits and
scraps (20.4)
(77) first second now third pant pant the panting stops and I hear
barely audible how I journeyed with my sack my tins in the dark (20.5)
(78) I hear it barely audible enough to make you laugh (26.3)
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(79) bits and scraps in the present things so ancient hear them murmur them
as they come barely audible to the mud (20.5)
The phrase seems to modify adjacent constituents in 76 and 78, a result
of structural ambiguity, but this relation is not entirely clear. In the case of
78 it seems that the most likely interpretation of the text leaves barely audible
as a discrete phrase: I hear it barely audible enough to make you laugh4, but
the multiple structure remains latent. In the rest of these examples syntactic
adjunction to the adjacent constituents is problematic, and the more appropriate
interpretation is that the phrases are inserted parenthetically. For example, in
77 I hear barely audible how I journeyed seems to consist of the sentence I hear
how I journeyed and parenthetical barely audible, as I hear barely audible is not
a constituent as the verb hear does not take an AP as a complement in most
versions of English: cf *I hear good and I hear well. The same analysis could
account for 79.
There are two important points to make about these examples. First, it is
almost impossible to tell the difference between a disjunct sentential adverb,
where the adverb does not modify any specific constituent (such as Personally
I don’t know what you’re on about), and a parenthetical. Both are syntactically
independent constituents inserted within a sentence, and it seems that the only
difference between them is the tonic or graphological demarcation used to sepa-
rate parentheticals explicitly. Perhaps the only difference between these types of
constituents is their distribution, as parentheticals are inserted within a sentence
whereas disjunct adverbials can also appear at either side of a sentence. This
point seem obvious, as it is in the definition of a parenthetical to appear within
a sentence; if it were to appear at the edges of the sentence, it would simply be
an independent adjacent constituent with no parenthesis to speak of, regardless
4In 76, the AP could be an attributive modification for the NP bits and scraps. This is an
ambiguous structure, but note that the decision made here (by a reader) is likely to be based
on their knowledge of the text i.e. the reading strategies identified above.
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of punctuation or intonation. Some kinds of parentheticals, such as or - or that
is-led insertions, have specific pragmatic constraints on their use and distribu-
tion (Blakemore 2007), but for the most part it seems that parentheticals and
disjunct constituents behave in the same way within discourse.
The second point is that a lot of the disjunct constituents occur in unusual
or awkward locations in the sentence. In examples 77 and 79, barely audible is
inserted to the right of the verb, within the verb phrases between the verb and
the adjoined preposition phrase. The same occurs with the insertion of many
parentheticals:
(80) on from there that moment and following not all a selection natural or-
der vast tracts of time (7.7)
(81) I see me now on my side I clutch it the sack we’re talking of the sack
with one hand behind my back (10.2)
(82) not fear I quote of losing it something else not known (10.4)
(83) she transfers the leash to her left hand and I the same instant to my
right the object now a little pale grey brick (29.6)
(84) take the sack in my arms strain it so light to me (36.2)
Similarly, there are examples of parentheticals inserted between the verb and
the nominal object:
(85) an apalca llama the history I knew my God the natural (14.1)
(86) my words mine alone one or two soundless brief movements
all the lower no sound when I can that’s the difference great confusion
(21.2)
(87) we have I imagine our eyes open and gaze before us (29.3)
In some cases, such as 83 and 84 this does not cause any problems, and
the sentence structure is not heavily disrupted by the parenthetical. However,
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in others there can be difficulties in interpreting the sentence because of the
location of the parenthetical. In 80, 81 and 86 the parentheticals are as long as
the sentences into which they have been inserted, and they make interpretation
of the sentences difficult. Thus in 81 it is not clear whether with one hand is
an adjunct of I clutch it or the parenthetical, even though the only intelligible
option would be I clutch it, and there are similar problems in 80 and 86. In 82,
85 and 87 the parentheticals create structural ambiguities, as they can merge
with the adjacent constituents, but the constituents formed by these readings
are unusual or ungrammatical, such as I quote of losing it.
In these cases, the parenthetical insertion into the sentence creates disorder
in the discourse. The meaning of the utterances can be recovered, as once the
reader recognises the parenthetical constituents the containing sentence can be
constructed and the meaning of the two utterances and their relation can be
inferred. However, it is interesting to consider what role Relevance plays in this
process. Sperber & Wilson (1995: 49) point out that Relevance involves the
offsetting of effort involved in interpretation with the cognitive effects achieved.
In the case of unclear communication, the hearer might not recover the intended
meaning if the cognitive effects of the utterance do not justify the effort in
interpretation.
Many of the sentences above are examples of unclear communication, where
the reader may not take the most ‘sensible’ interpretation since the effort in-
volved in that interpretation is not outweighed by its meaningful import. For
example in 81, the effort involved in interpretation (a), where the sack we’re
talking of the sack is a parenthetical within the sentence I clutch it with one
hand behind my back, may outweigh the benefits of constructing two sensible
constituents; instead, we may be left with interpretation (b), with the sack with
one hand behind my back as a constituent, an unusual one to say the least.
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Principle A in section 2.4 above that the reader tends to extract the most gram-
matical sentence available, but it seems that in some cases the effort involved
in reconstructing the most grammatical reading might not be justified and the
reader may ‘settle’ for a less sensible, possibly ungrammatical interpretation.
3.4.4 Theoretical issues: Relevance and literary texts
Relating to this point, there is an interesting question about whether Relevance
operates in the same way in a literary text as in ‘normal’ communication. Theo-
rists of ‘literary competence’ argue that reading a literary text involves a greater
attention to meaning than normal communication. Culler argues that Relevance
is not entirely applicable to the interpretation of literary texts:
. . . the interpretation of any piece of communication is a function of
the assumptions that are brought to bear on it. As the radius of
communication expands, the amount of shared background assump-
tions is attenuated and the indeterminacy correspondingly grows.
Literary works are the limiting case in that the radius can be ar-
bitrarily large. . . while the interpretation of dialogue is constrained
by the principle that the speaker formulates his sentences in such a
way that the first interpretation consistent with the principle of rel-
evance that occurs to the addressee is the intended one, the reading
of literary works is not, and they are consequently open to constant
reinterpretation.
(Culler 1987: 187)
According to this argument, with the examples of unclear communication
above (such as 81) all readings are available since the reader of a literary text
pays more attention to the meanings of a text and absorbs them all as opposed
to the first which comes to mind.
However, this argument is flawed in one crucial misunderstanding of Rele-
vance. Culler mistakes the inference process involved in creating an utterance
from a linguistic form, with the inference process involved in constructing larger
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(i.e. thematic) meanings from a text. The inference process described by Sper-
ber & Wilson is not simply a theory for how speakers interpret meaning in
spontaneous conversation, but for the theory for how a language user constructs
meaning based on any stimulus (spoken or written language for example). The
selection of the most relevant meaning from a stimulus applies to any kind of
ostensive communication, and it applies instantly; for example, when someone
reads the text of 81, he or she may select interpretation (a) or (b), depending on
contextual factors; each is in effect a different utterance, within the same text.
Since the text is a written literary text, the reader may read the text again
and notice the reading they missed. However, in both instances, their reading
involves the creation of the utterances (a) or (b) from example 81 by inference,
and this inferencing process is always constrained by Relevance. Otherwise it
would not be possible to resolve the double syntactic structure as two separate
utterances, and the text would have no meaning, rather than two meanings.
The interpretation of literary meanings may be unconstrained - the reader may
recognise an utterance as an allusion or quotation, or as a similar utterance to
another within the text - but the inferencing process involved in each construc-
tion of meaning is always constrained. Culler mistakes the generation of meaning
from text (stimulus) with the generation of meaning from meanings5. At this
level of pragmatic inference, ‘normal’ communication and the communication
5This confusion is captured in the postface to the second edition of Relevance (1995:
260-266), where Sperber & Wilson amend the principle to distinguish between Relevance in
communication and cognition. In the revised version, there are two principles of Relevance:
1. Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance.
2. Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its
own optimal relevance.
(Sperber & Wilson 1995: 260)
It is arguable that 1 accounts for 2, but the theoretical discussion of the relationship be-
tween communication and cognition does not impact on the strength of the individual claims.
Principle 2 is the principle which we are concerned with throughout, since this dissertation
focuses on acts of communication.
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of literary texts cannot be separated. This is an important issue for literary
linguistic analysis, as it demonstrates that there is no distinctive character for
the inferential interpretation of linguistic form in literary texts.
3.4.5 Parentheticals and experimental style
It can be seen from the above examples that parentheticals present many prob-
lems for interpretation. It seems that the tendency for parentheticals and dis-
junct constituents is another example of chunking in the text, as this involves
moving chunks of text around and putting them in locations where they would
not normally go by syntactic operations (Movement) or in an orderly discourse.
However, it should be emphasised that the meaning of the text is still recov-
erable in most instances. With parentheticals, the constituents can be identified
as independent units in the discourse and rendered meaningful by pragmatic in-
ference. With adverbs and adverb phrases, the interpretation of the constituents
as adjuncts essentially excludes them from the syntactic representation of the
containing or adjacent sentence; they are thus interpreted as independent con-
stituents in discourse and understood in the same way as parentheticals. It
seems that, when these chunks of text are found in unusual places or construc-
tions within the text, it is often possible to interpret the problematic text as a
non-sentential unit of discourse rather than a constituent of an ill-formed sen-
tence. Therefore in these examples the chunking of the text does not as much
produce ungrammaticality, as produce an unorderly discourse.
It should be emphasised that the relations that tie these chunks to the sur-
rounding discourse are established by meaning, and not by structure. It is in this
respect that the examples of parentheticals and adverbs resemble the examples
of conjunction above: the chunks of text are combined as chunks of meaning,
and are not combined with respect to structural relations. If the adverbs or
CHAPTER 3. HOW IT IS: DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 53
parentheticals were moved with respect to structural relations, they would re-
semble the right-dislocated examples above (42, 43) and would fall under the
larger category of Movement-shifted adjuncts. This shows an interesting con-
trast between conjunction and adjunction: when adjuncts like PPs or AvPs do
not adhere to structural restrictions they can easily be interpreted as parenthet-
icals rather than ungrammatical constituents; when conjunction applies without
regard to structural constraints, the resulting structure is ungrammatical and
does not allow for the same parenthetical interpretation. This indicates that
adjuncts have more syntactic autonomy than conjuncts, even though conjuncts
can be fully-formed clauses in themselves.
It is important to point out that this procedure of combining units of lan-
guage with respect meaning relations rather than structural relations is not
typical of any use of language. The examples of adverbs and parentheticals
violate constraints on discourse, but could easily be generated; however, some
of the examples of conjunction violate syntactic constraints on the combination
and would not be generated in normal use. It seems that the most significant
contribution of the chunking style is that the units of language which make up
the text are autonomous meaningful objects, and this reduces the likelihood of
sound structural relations between the units. As a result there can be many in-
stances of ungrammaticality, where chunks are combined in a manner in which
they would not be in a text led by structural principles, although in many cases
these relations can be rendered legible by inference.
The obvious pre-condition for legibility in all of these cases is that the chunks
of text are themselves well formed, as otherwise they may not be isolated as in-
dependent constituents within the discourse. The following section examines ex-
amples of constituent-internal difficulties caused by ellipsis, considering whether
they are resolved in a similar manner and whether they can be attributed to
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the same feature of the Experimental style.
3.5 Ellipsis and Deletion
3.5.1 Introduction
As mentioned above, How It Is is often described as marking Beckett’s move
to a more ‘minimal’ style, where he ‘pared down language to its most essential
parts’ (Calder 2001: 72). One of the most significant formal aspects of this
reduction is ellipsis, and this features heavily throughout the text. Ellipsis is a
common feature of everyday language use and it is used to avoid unnecessary
repetition or redundancy. For example:
John will go to the shops, and Mary will too.
Here the meaning of the second clause is Mary will go to the shops too; the
VP go to the shops is elided to avoid repetition and the gap in its place is coin-
dexed with the VP go to the shops in the first clause. The peculiarities of the
formal constraints on ellipsis indicate that it is a syntactic operation (Lasnik
2003), and it has been assumed throughout generative linguistics that ellipsis
is an effective test for structure (Radford 1997: 110). However, it is notable
that pragmatic considerations of economy and non-redundancy drive ellipsis,
and that the reconstruction of sentence structures may owe as much to commu-
nicative principles as to syntactic structures. Regardless, it is uncontroversial
that ellipsis is a common feature in language and that it involves highly for-
malised relations between syntactic constituents. In a text where the relations
between constituents are often very unclear, we may expect this to present some
difficulties.
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3.5.2 Well-formed ellipsis
There are examples of well-formed elided structures throughout How It Is. Con-
sider the following examples of nominal ellipsis (an underline represents the
gap):
(88) first one wing then the other sometimes for a change (9.7)
(89) next another image yet another so soon again the third perhaps (15.5)
(90) which leg brief void and barely audible the right it’s preferable (19.2)
(91) someone listening another noting or the same (25.7)
(92) I wake from sleep how much nearer to the last that of men (27.5)
(93) it’s not said or I don’t hear it’s one or the other the same more or less
(22.3)
In examples 88-91, adjectives or determiners appear in NPs where the head
nouns are elided, which can be interpreted as the other wing, the third image,
the right leg, the same person and the last sleep respectively. The referents
for the gaps can sometimes be unclear or ambiguous, as with the same (there
is also the pronominal interpretation), but overall these elided structures are
unproblematic. This could be because they all have definite articles, which
strongly indicate nominal expressions and hence the ellipsis of the head noun.
3.5.3 Ill-formed ellipsis
However, there are also many examples of nominal ellipsis that are more prob-
lematic:
(94) life life the other above in the light (8.1)
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(95) vast stretch of time the beginning this life first sign very first of life
(8.2)
(96) a crumb of tunny then mouldy eat mouldy no need to worry (8.5)
(97) close my eyes not the blue the others at the back (8.8)
(98) move my lips and all around all the lower that helps me understand
(18.1)
(99) words won’t come no word not even soundless I’m in need of a word
(18.5)
(100) I close my eyes not the blue the others at the back (28.5)
(101) one or two soundless brief movements of the lower face all the lower
no sound when I can (21.1)
(102) ages each heroic seen from the next when will the last come when was
my golden every rat has its heyday (10.1)
(103) my pain which of my many the deep beyond reach (32.7)
(104) could not as much be said always said my little lost always vast stretch
of time (34.4)
In most of these cases it seems clear that there has been ellipsis in the gap
indicated, but it is not always clear what the referent is or what the constituent
means. For example, in 94 it seems that the other is an elided nominal ex-
pression, as nominal other (as in the foreign thing or person) does not seem
relevant. However, it is not clear what may be the referent for this gap, since
there is no parallel NP for the gap to identify with, as there was in 88. The
most likely interpretation is that the gap is coindexed with life in the preceding
NP, but there is a clear mismatch between the constituents and the instability
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of this structure remains. The same occurs in 103, where there is a mismatch
between the singular number of the previous NP my pain and the plural my
many, and 104, where there is no plausible nominal for identity in the preceding
text. There is a related problem in 95, where the adjunction of the preposition
phrase (PP) to the gap creates an asymmetry in the indexed structures. Elided
ordinal constructions are usually unproblematic, as with the related sound con-
struction the last in 102, but in this case the adjunction seems to disrupt the
interpretation of the gap; usually the PP would adjoin to the first NP and all
of the post-head modification would be elided in the second NP i.e. first sign
of life very first .
In 96-102 the words left in the expressions seem strange in an elided struc-
ture. For example, in 97 the blue is unusual since the standard use for a colour
is the blue one/ones, with the nominal filled by a pronoun. This departure from
standard use is not entirely uninterpretable, and the meaning can be inferred,
but it should be noted that this use is unusual compared to analogous exam-
ples, such as the last or the best. This indicates that the acceptability of certain
kinds of elliptical structures is graduated, and that the degree of interpretability
varies as a function of the lexical properties of the words left in the structure
(the adjectives or determiners). 96-102 are examples from the lower end of that
scale, where the acceptability is as low as to indicate that the interpretation
of an elliptical constituent may not be plausible. It is debatable whether these
examples are grammatically deviant, but it should be noted that the relations
which give rise to this strangeness are independent of meaning; there is no dif-
ference in meaning to account for why the blue is less acceptable than the last ;
this kind of structure can be generated, but it does not occur with blue. Re-
gardless of the explanation, it should be clear that these examples of nominal
ellipsis are unusual and would not be produced in most standard usage.
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There are other examples where it seems words have been omitted by ellipsis.
For example, in many cases the subject NPs are missing, but the sentences are
not in the imperative:
(105) saying to myself no worse you’re no worse and was worse (9.5)
(106) I see sometimes see in the mud part one sometimes saw (11.2)
(107) I have suffered must have suffered (23.2)
(108) be with Pim have been with Pim have him behind me hear it said
he’ll come back another will come (23.5)
(109) there’s another of my resources was once not now any more (25.4)
(110) the scene is empty a few animals still then goes out no more blue I
stay there (31.3)
(111) that old dream back again I live it now at this creeping hour know
what it’s worth was worth (39.2)
In some of these cases, such as 107, the missing NP is clearly coindexed
to the subject of the first clause; alternatively, it may be that the VPs are in
apposition. In most of the rest of the examples the antecedent is less obvious
and the clauses are difficult to interpret. In 105, 108, 109 and 110 the local
antecedents clash with the inflection of the verbs: in 105, the gap in you’re no
worse and was worse does not coindex with the previous clausal subject you
because of the first-person inflection of was. Rather, the gap does not find its
coreferent in any nominative first person NP, but in the first-person accusative
myself in the previous clause; this is not as much a formal connection (consider
the ungrammaticality of *myself was worse), but a relation derived by inference.
In 106 and 111 the gaps are separated from the NP with which they coindex by
CHAPTER 3. HOW IT IS: DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 59
separate constituents, and the interpretation of the coindexical relations become
difficult or implausible.
There are similar problems with VP-ellipsis:
(112) this voice is truly changeable of which so little left in me (15.2)
(113) no one will ever come again and shine his light on me and nothing
ever again of other days (15.4)
In 112 the ellipsis is awkward since the of which construction does not com-
bine with the coindexed is, unless one also infers a missing expletive there. In
113, the coindexed VP does not match the gap because of the adverb ever,
which lies between the auxiliary and main verb in the first clause but can only
come after the main verb in the coindexed gap. All of these examples do not
function in the same way as the elided nominal expressions, since there are no
antecedent constituents to index the elided words with; rather, the words are
simply missing. The relations between the adjacent constituents can still be
reconstructed, however, and these examples are not as unusual as some of the
nominals with missing or asymmetrical antecedents.
3.5.4 Ellipsis and Deletion
This is an example of one of the chief difficulties in reading a text like How It Is,
where syntactic connections between separate constituents can be inferred but
are not explicit. The ellipsis interpretations of the texts (where it is assumed
there are missing prepositions) allow the reader to infer meaningful relations
between the constituents and to resolve the problems within the constituents.
Inference relations are constrained by the communicative principle of Relevance
and can be ignored or amended to fall in line with contextual factors. In con-
trast, syntactic ellipsis relations are not amenable to change, regardless of the
irrelevance of the reconstituted structure, as they are formal and not led by
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communicative principles. Consider regular verbal ellipsis, where the reconsti-
tution of the elided gap is constrained specifically by the sentence: in I went
to the shops to buy a loaf of bread and Europe, c-command6 relations dictate
that the gap can only be coindexed to buy and not went, even though the in-
terpretation may seem implausible. This departs from the inference approach
in examples like 108, where the missing NP is recovered by the effort to make
the communication Relevant.
Therefore there is a clear difference between ellipsis, which is formally con-
strained and affected by adjacent structures, and deletion (hereafter Deletion
for the sake of clarity), which is inferred for communicative reasons and affected
by adjacent meanings. In the examples of nominal ellipsis above, the structural
information contained in the stranded adjectives licences the interpretation of
elided structures; so in 95, the reconstitution of an elided nominal in very first
of life is brought about by the fact that adjective phrases like very first cannot
contain PPs. The reconstitution of the ellipsis then follows from this structural
cue, and is constrained by the adjacent structures like the NP first sign that
immediately precedes it.
It is unclear how this process of Deletion is implemented. In the above
examples, it is evident that there are missing subjects, or that the phrases
with definite articles should be headed by nouns, but it is not clear why some of
these constituents have been left out. Significantly, there is no discernible formal
motivation for the Deletion process: whereas the ellipsis interpretation of 95 is
motivated by phrase structure rules and the lexical information contained in
6’C-command’ is a formal relation in language which holds between the subject of a sentence
and an anaphoric element (e.g. pronoun) in its predicate (Matthews 2005: 49). For example,
in John’s father hurt himself, the reflexive himself is c-commanded by the NP John’s father, so
himself must be a pronoun representing the father of John, rather than John. Later Minimalist
linguistic work (Chomsky 1995: 35) has proposed that c-command can be structurally defined
in some detail, but for our purposes it is important simply to note that c-command is a strictly
controlled grammatical operation that is predicated on hierarchical relations. C-command
cannot be overridden by contextual assumptions.
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the adjective, the interpretation of missing NP in 107 is only motivated by the
(non-guaranteed) knowledge of typical constructions and a desire to reconstitute
a more stable discourse.
This is an important point: since Deletion does not seem to have any specific
constraint on its operation, it may seem that the entire text is unstable as a
result; if words have been deleted in these examples, they may have been deleted
in others but not noticed. This is a corrosive strategy for interpretation, as it
follows that no structures can be attested uncontroversially, as they may in
fact be Deletion-reduced forms of other more primary structures. However, this
corrosion does not occur because Deletion is only interpreted when it is relevant;
if this interpretation does not serve to produce a more relevant utterance it does
not occur. As mentioned above, the principle of Relevance indicates that one
chooses the most immediately relevant interpretation, and this principle curbs
the unruly problem of recursive Deletion interpretation.
What this does indicate is that there is a sharp distinction to be drawn
between syntactic ellipsis and non-syntactic Deletion. Some of the grammatical
operations may not be well formed, as with some of the nominal examples given
above, but they function on the basis of structural relations and are only unusual
because of the malfunction of these structures. However, in some other cases it
is not clear whether the deletion process is grammatical or non-grammatical.
3.6 Discussion
In all of these examples, words are omitted either by a syntactic operation of
ellipsis, in which the gap should be indexed with a neighbouring constituent,
or by Deletion, an extra-grammatical process. Many of the examples would
not be generated by any grammar and appear to be examples of Deletion, as
they differ in crucial ways from the other well-behaved examples of ellipsis seen
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throughout. The question is whether these examples of Deletion are part of the
Experimental style of the text.
Instinctively this seems right, as the Deletion seen in How It Is is certainly
not a feature of normal language use. The text’s Experimental style is described
above in terms of the chunking of the text, where pieces of text are moved around
without regard to orderly discourse or syntactic movements. The general char-
acteristic that unified the examples of chunking seen above was a treatment of
language that disregards structural relations and moves pieces of texts as units
of meaning. These examples of Deletion seem to exhibit similar properties,
as pieces of text are Deleted without regard to structural relations in a man-
ner which resembles but does not replicate syntactic operations. The Deletion
examples might not be regarded as a direct result of Beckett’s chunking style
specifically, but more as a product of a certain way of writing, where parts of
language are moved around and deleted in a disorderly fashion.
Therefore it seems appropriate to generalise the definition of the Experimen-
tal style to encompass these kinds of non-syntactic Deletion: the Experimental
style of the text treats units of language as autonomous units of meaning, with-
out regard to some structural constraints. Meaning-related chunks are conjoined
in spite of structural asymmetries (examples 56-65); parenthetical chunks are
inserted in spite of the structural disruption (53, 79, 80-82, 85-87); gaps are
coindexed by Relevance-led meaning relations in spite of structural require-
ments (94-101, 108-113). When these syntactic connections seem awkward or
disjunct, pragmatic inference connects these meaningful chunks and constructs
a coherent discourse.
It should be emphasised that this kind of Experimental writing is a radical
departure from normal style. Structural dependency is one of the fundamental
characteristics of language as a formal system (Chomsky 1971 [1957]), but it
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seems that structural relations are ignored in favour of combining pieces of
language according to meaningful relations in the style of How It Is. As a
result, the procedures by which a great deal of the text is formed is not in
fact ‘linguistic’, and the Experimental style moves away from the naturalism of
representing actual linguistic forms to a system of non-linguistic combinatory
procedures. We will return to this point in section 4.5.
3.7 Summary
It is interesting to note that while the examples above disregard clausal or VP-
adjunct syntactic relations, they leave phrase-internal and predicator-object re-
lations intact. The Experimental style of the text involves the displacement and
Deletion of chunks of text without regard to many syntactic relations, but the
units of text which are moved around are largely well-formed internally, and
those that are less well-formed (such as some of the examples of NP ellipsis
above) can usually be recovered by pragmatic means. It seems that the Exper-
imentation of the text, despite the problems it may produce in some instances,
does not cause significant problems for many kinds of linguistic structure. In
most of the cases discussed above, pragmatic inference can still recover legible
utterances from the deficient or disorderly structures.
However, it should be noted that How It Is is not Beckett’s most radically
Experimental text, as he developed this ‘minimalist’ style further as his career
progressed. In the following section I will examineWorstward Ho, Beckett’s last
substantial text and one of his most radically Experimental works, to see if this
Experimentation developed in any significant way and whether the texts show
any other kinds of irregularities that might be of interest.
Chapter 4
Worstward Ho: description
and analysis
4.1 Introduction
This section explores the linguistic deviations inWorstward Ho. Since the extent
of the experimentation in Worstward Ho seems to be much higher, we find that
there are more deviations and many different kinds of deviations not found in
the other text. I discuss whether these deviations can be explained in a similar
manner as with How It Is.
4.2 Worstward Ho
The works that followed How It Is continued with Beckett’s radical program of
reduction. In his dramatic works, this took the form of a move towards mono-
logues, as with Not I and Eh Joe. This seemed to reach its logical conclusion in
1970 with Breath, a play which consisted of a single breath on a stage filled with
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rubbish and a solitary listening figure. However, Beckett continued to write
relatively substantial plays, which concentrated on geometrically precise bodily
movements and despairing monologues. In his prose work, Beckett continued
to experiment with punctuation and tended increasingly toward short forms,
although he still produced a number of relatively substantial novellas like Ill
Seen Ill Said, Company and The Lost Ones. Published in 1983, Worstward Ho
marked the last major development in Beckett’s prose style, where the fragmen-
tation of language that had characterised his prose reached its peak.
Yet despite the years of stylistic development and experimentation that in-
tervened, Worstward Ho nevertheless shares a great deal in common with How
It Is. Visually the texts are very different, and this can be seen from the opening
page of Worstward Ho:
(114) Say a body. Where none. No mind. Where none. That at least. A
place. Where none. For the body. To be in. Move in. Out of. Back
into. No. No out. No back. Only in. Stay in. On in. Still. (7.3)1
It was explained above that punctuation does not create grammatical rela-
tions but provides guidance for their interpretation. The style of punctuation
in Worstward Ho is the converse of How It Is, over-prescribing sentence breaks
where the punctuation of How It Is provided too little guidance. The results
are similar in that orthography does not appear to dictate the interpretation
of grammatical sentences as it does in conventional use; for example For the
body and to be in will be interpreted as syntactically related by adjunction in
the majority of readings, but the orthography indicates that they are separate
(incomplete) units. The precise effects of over and under-punctuation may be
markedly different, but they both destabilise the grammatical interpretation of
the text in a similar manner.
The texts also share the Experimental chunking style described above, as
1Hereafter referencing page number and paragraph number in Beckett (1999 [1983]).
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it can be seen from the above example that Worstward Ho contains a great
deal of disjunct and unconnected pieces of text placed together. While the
interpretation of constituents is not fully constrained by the punctuation of
text, it is clear that the tendency for abruptly demarcated units of text leads
to a text composed of chunks of text rather than full sentences. However, it
should be noted that the extent of the chunking-fragmentation in Worstward
Ho is far greater than in How It Is or any of Beckett’s works, and there are
significant differences between the texts as a result. In the following section I will
discuss a few of the tendencies for difficulty or ungrammaticality in Worstward
Ho, and I will consider whether they may be related to this extensive stylistic
Experimentation.
4.3 Ellipsis and Deletion
4.3.1 Evidence
The main cause of the difficulty in reading Worstward Ho is the extensive use of
deletion. The examples from How It Is above show that ellipsis is a prominent
feature of Beckett’s writing. In most cases the deletion seems to follow nor-
mal syntactic procedures of ellipsis, although sometimes the indexing of the gap
to another filled constituent is disrupted by other structural anomalies (3.5.2).
However, in some of the examples (3.5.3) it seems that the process is not con-
strained by syntactic relations; instead, words are simply Deleted without regard
to structural relations. As a result the text was sometimes rendered illegible,
although in most cases pragmatic inference could resolve these problems to con-
struct a meaningful interpretation.
In Worstward Ho, both kinds of ellipsis are used very heavily, often causing
serious problems for interpretation. There are many cases of verbal ellipsis
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where structural asymmetries make coindexing the elided gap difficult:
(115) It stands. What? Yes. Say it stands. Had to up in the end and stand.
(8.2)
(116) Say yes that the bones may pain till no choice but stand. Somehow
up and stand. (8.2-9.1)
(117) A place. For the body. To be in. Move in. Out of. (7.3)
(118) No knowing how know only no out of. Into only. (7.3)
(119) Where then but there see now another. Bit by bit an old man and
child. (13.6)
In these examples, it seems that verbal ellipsis is the process by which the
text is interpreted, but there are structural problems in reconstructing the VPs.
In 117, there are subtle problems with the reconstruction of the elided VPs,
particularly in the second gap.
These problems are exacerbated by the heavy punctuation of the text, as
they indicate separate sentences whereas the constituents are all tied to the one
structure. The punctuation and subsequent prosody suggest that to be in and
move in are in apposition, but in fact be in and move in are in apposition (to be
in, to move in), where the out of then adjoins to the move in clause, taking move
as the index for its elided verb (move out of ). Therefore the punctuation implies
the interpretation a place for the body to be in. Move in, move out of, but this
does not work since the move clauses appear to be imperative and the second
one is ill-formed because of the stranded preposition2. Since the imperative
reconstruction is prevented (because of the presence of the preposition of ), the
other plausible reconstruction is To be in, move into, out of (where the move
constituents are coindexed IPs); however, it can be seen that this explanation
2Note that in the non-imperative interpretation to move out of, the preposition is not
stranded since it is part of the infinitival verbal construction.
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does not account for the deletion of the to in into. Therefore it does not seem
that there is a principled ellipsis explanation for the reconstruction of this text.
This appears to be caused by a clash between the different chains of elided gaps;
the gap in Out of indexes to the IP Move in, and this does not work since
the IP is itself unfilled and coindexed to another constituent; cf *I will meet
John, move into my new house and out of the old place. A similar explanation
can account for 118.
In 115 and 116, the preposition up occurs on its own in a VP position
(contained within an IP in 115; coordinated to a VP and with an adjoined
adverb in 116), indicating that there are elided verbs. However, in 115 there
is difficulty in coindexing the gap for several reasons. First, the immediately
available verb for coindexing, the 3rd person present-inflected stands in Say it
stands, does not correspond to the infinitival position of the gap in Had to up.
Second, stand seems unlikely since the gap is followed by coordinated VP stand ;
the reconstructed sentence Had to stand up in the end and stand suffers from
many problems. Third, the other verb that precedes the gap, Say, could not
coindex since it could not take the prepositional complement up. Therefore the
ellipsis interpretation is riddled with problems because of asymmetries with the
surrounding constituents. A similar explanation can account for 116.
4.3.2 Deletion of ill-formed ellipsis?
Despite the fact that these examples deviate from normal syntactic ellipsis, it
is unclear whether they can be described as non-syntactic Deletion. Rather, it
may be that these examples are simply ill-formed examples of ellipsis. Indeed it
is worth noting that they can all be interpreted by appealing to the context. In
115, it is clear that a verb like get should fill the elided gap, even though there
is no referent in the preceding sentences, and in 117 the relations between the
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VPs are fairly easy to interpret, despite the unusual processes of reconstruction
that are involved. Regardless, it should be clear that these examples indicate a
disregard for the structural relations involved in verbal ellipsis, and that the kind
of problems caused for interpretation are similar to those seen in some of the
examples seen in How It Is. In examples like 117, it is clear that the chunking
of the text into short orthographic sentences causes these problems, and it is
arguable that these examples of ellipsis indicate that the Experimentation of
Beckett’s style causes problems for grammatical interpretation.
4.3.3 Deletion: evidence
This is more obvious in many other examples of heavy-handed ellipsis and Dele-
tion throughout:
(120) Dim white and hair so fair that in that dim light dim white. (15.3)
(121) So sudden gone sudden back unchanged as one dark shade plod unre-
ceding on. (15.3)
(122) The void. How try say? How try fail? No try no fail. (17.3)
(123) Where if not there it too? (18.4)
(124) The same narrow void. Before the staring eyes. Where it too if not there
too? (19.1)
(125) Ask in vain. Or not in vain if say no knowing. (19.3)
(126) First back on to three. Not yet to try worsen. (22.2)
(127) Clenched eyes clamped to it alone. Alone? No. Too. To it too. (22.2)
(128) How better worse so-missay? (25.1)
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(129) No words for what when words gone. (28.2)
(130) Just enough still to joy that only they. (29.2)
(131) What were skull to go? (46.2)
In these examples, it is apparent that some constituents are missing, but
the evidence for this comes from inferencing and not syntactic structures. For
example, in 120 there are no clear syntactic links between in that dim light and
dim white. It is indicated by the surrounding structure that they are related,
since they are preceded by the complementizer that, which takes a clausal com-
plement, but there is no ellipsis process to explain the deletion of the missing
constituent, which can be inferred as it is or some similar structure (that in that
dim light it is dim white).
Similar interpretations are necessary to understand the other examples, and
in many cases it is unclear what this deleted constituent should be. In 121, there
must be a subject for the verb plod, which might be understood as pronominal
they, but there is no antecedent for ellipsis reference. In 125, the if clause is
missing a subject, which might be inferred as a pronoun like you, and there is
no clear relation between say and no knowing, which might be inferred to be
something like there is or some other basic relation that doesn’t require a clear
antecedent. In 126, the relation between the adverbial Not yet and the IP to
try worsen is unclear; since they are in the same sentence one might presume
the adverbial adjoins to the IP, but this does not work and it seems that there
is a deleted main verb to which both of these constituents should be connected,
although it is not clear what this could be.
In 127, the constituent To it too seems almost illegible, but this can actually
be reconstituted by ellipsis relations. However, this interpretation requires that
we infer the constituent is to be read as an online clarification of the kind found
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in spoken language; an example like Clenched eyes clamped to it alone. To it
too. would not licence the extensive ellipsis reconstruction required, since it
needs to be clarified that too is intended to be a replacement for alone before
it can be understood as a constituent connected by ellipsis. Therefore this
example does not display Deletion as such, but ellipsis relations licensed by
Relevance. It also shows that Beckett’s use of ellipsis is not always motivated
by economy in language use, but also by more superficial demands, as the elided
form To it too is as much a play on words as a meaningful sentence; that is,
the punning meaning of the repetition is just as prominent as the deeply buried
ellipsis meaning. This is a minor point, but there are other examples of this
kind of contrivance, as will be seen below.
In 122, all of the question clauses seem to be missing words, like a subject
NP, infinitival to, or do-support for the question form. There are no antecedents
for the reconstruction of any elided constituents, and it is unclear how the verb
try (presumably a main verb, given its position) relates to the following verbs
(presumably in infinitive form). Thus it is unclear who or what is being asked
a question, and what is being asked. The utterance might be reconstituted by
Relevance relations, piecing together the meanings ‘try’ and ‘say’ and inferring
from the context that the speaker is asking ‘how should one try to say some-
thing’. But this is clearly unstable and it is possible that many readers might
find this example illegible.
123, 124, 128 and 131 all suffer from similar problems; the orthographic sen-
tences have question marks, but the necessary constituents in English questions
are missing, so it appears that these constituents have been Deleted for some
reason. Crucially, this causes the texts to become almost completely illegible.
For example, how could one paraphrase a meaningful utterance based on 131?
There is no clear relation between the IP to go and either skull or the question
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word What, and skull does not combine readily with the VP What were. It
seems that the Deletion of so many constituents necessary for the question form
causes this constituent to become entirely illegible.
The malformation of questions is in fact one example of two related trends in
Worstward Ho: the evasion or Deletion of function words, and the malfunction
of crude Movement. This first trend can be shown by the following example,
which are missing functional do-support:
(132) Where it too if not there too? Ask not. (19.1)
(133) The head. Ask not if it can go. (19.2)
(134) Time to lose. Gain time to lose. As the soul once. The world once.
(20.1)
(135) Go no nor come again. (40.1)
(136) So skull not go. What left of skull not go. (46.2)
There are also some related examples of unusual and contrived negation,
where the related paraphrase would involve do-support, as with examples 125
and 126 above and the following:
(137) The no face bad. The no hands bad. (21.2)
(138) One can go not for good. (26.3)
One explanation of examples 132, 133, 135 and 136 may be that the nega-
tion is in an archaic non-standard form, and that the evasion of do-support is
not through Deletion but simply a feature of a dialect. This may be true to
some extent, as archaisms are found throughout Beckett’s writing as a stylistic
device (Pilling 1976: 49-50), but example 138 indicates that this dialect is not
consistent throughout. In Early Modern English dialects of the kind mimicked
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here, the negator not would go before the main verb go, not after it, as in many
Shakespearean examples (Radford 1997: 223). Thus 138 would be One can not
go for good, and the version above would not be generated by either the stan-
dard or non-standard version English. Rather, it appears that the placement
of not in this example is an imitation of the non-standard dialect, and the fact
that it is a non-generated example indicates (but does not guarantee) that the
other examples of non-standard negation are not generated but rather are con-
trived in order to avoid functional do-support. This cannot be guaranteed since
Beckett mixes dialects and registers throughout his work (Pilling 1976; Cohn
1962), but this theory does cohere with a lot of the other evidence relating to
the Deletion of function words. Do-support is certainly conspicuous in its ab-
sence, as there are no examples of auxiliary do in the entire text, but there are
62 (orthographic) questions and many more instances of verbal negation3.
It can also be seen from the examples of ellipsis and Deletion already shown
that auxiliary be and have are also used infrequently. There are no present tense
forms of have, only two occurrences of past tense had (paragraphs 8.2, 39.2),
and no tensed forms of auxiliary be in the entire text. There are few occurrences
of main verb forms of be, and these forms are frequently elided when adjacency
can allow the reader to infer the predicative relation (as in 120 above); as a
result, there are no occurrences of functional operators like expletive there and
it. However, there are many occurrences of be in the imperative tense, and it
is used frequently throughout in a series of constructions that appear to mimic
passivisation.
3The instances of verbal negation cannot be counted since the number of verbal construc-
tions is uncertain due to the excessive Deletion and ellipsis throughout. As an indication,
there are 61 occurrences of not alone, although some may or may not be involved in verbal
negation.
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4.4 Movement
4.4.1 Passives: evidence
This question malformation is an example of the second trend for malfunctional
Movement processes, which occurs in many forms throughout the text. There
are many examples of texts which seem to mimic passivisation:
(139) Say on. Be said on. (7.1)
(140) Say for be said. (7.2)
(141) See for be seen. (13.2)
(142) Bow it down. Be it bowed. (21.2)
(143) Be they so said. (27.2)
(144) Said for missaid. For be missaid. (37.1)
Most of these examples appear to be in passive imperative forms, as in Be
warned. Passive imperative constructions are unusual constructions:
Because the agentive role is associated with subject function, pas-
sive imperatives are relatively infrequent. This reflects the fact that
in declarative whose predicate assigns an agentive role to one of the
arguments the argument concerned is aligned with the subject of the
active, not the passive. Compare active Kim attacked him and pas-
sive He was attacked by Kim, where only the former has an agentive
subject. Thus Attack him makes perfectly natural imperative, but
Be attacked by Kim does not.
(Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 932)
The verb Say follows a similar pattern: Kim says it becomes It was said
by Kim, and Say it becomes Be said by Kim. The crucial difference between
this example and the Attack example is that patient role is recoverable in the
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passive as the null pronominal subject with Attack, but not with Say ; this is
because the null pronominal subject in an imperative can only be 2nd person or
first person (singular and plural), but the patient pronominal patient of verbs
like Say (shifted into subject roles in passive) can only be third person; consider
*I say he, *I say we 4.
The examples from Worstward Ho seem to have been transformed into the
passive in this manner, and the problems of agency seem to explain why these
utterances are difficult of not impossible to interpret. 139 seems to be an obvious
example of passivisation, since the apparently passive Be said on is preceded
by the matching untransformed imperative Say on. This example is further
complicated by the inclusion of the adjunct on, which has an obvious structural
connection to the imperative Say (although the meaning may be unclear) but
not to the passivised version. 140 and 144 seem to involve a similar process
with Say and Missay. 142 and 143 involve similar processes (Bow has the
same patient restrictions as Say), but both include the null subjects after the
imperative verbs. 141 seems to mimic the same process that is seen in 140, but
it is not uninterpretable in the same way, since See does not encounter the same
agency restrictions as Say ; rather, see behaves like Attack in taking any kind of
patient pronoun. This indicates that it is indeed passivisation that is attempted
in these examples, but without respect to the syntactic restrictions placed upon
the process.
4.4.2 Passives: discussion
There are two points to make about these examples. First, one of the most
striking aspects of these failed transformations is their uninterpretability. Some
of the examples of ellipsis or Deletion above could be reconstructed into mean-
4Note that I say ‘we’ would work, as ‘we’ would not be functioning as a first person
pronominal patient but as a nominalised third person patient equivalent to ‘this word’.
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ingful utterances by referring to the residual structural information and what
it might indicate about missing structures that would fill the utterance. In the
examples of passives, this is not possible, since the recoverability of the passive
construction is dependent on hierarchical structural relations, and violation of
any structural restrictions results in the unrecoverability of the agency relations
that allow the verbs to create predicative relations. Thus one cannot interpret
who or what has Said orMissaid in the examples above, and what has been Said
or Missaid. In these cases, the ungrammaticality leads to uninterpretability.
This effectively reduces the utterance to a sequence of words, rather than a
sentence or grammatical constituent. Deriving meaning from the text involves
inferring a connection between the semantic meanings of the individual words,
and considering how these meaningful objects might be connected in a passive
relation, producing often paradoxical results. Crucially, the impetus to connect
these parts in a passive relation does not come from structural information,
but from some sort of meta-structural information gained from knowledge of
the familiar surface structure. That is, the reader recognises the passive form
of Be + past participle, and infers that there may be passive relations to be
extracted, but he/she does not process the utterance as an instance of syntactic
passivisation.
Related to this, the second point is that these examples of failed passivisa-
tion could not be generated, and this indicates that the utterances above are
not genuine imperative passives, but texts created based on the surface struc-
ture of similar utterances. In most use, passivisation is driven by a need to
make agent-patient relations more explicit, but constructions like Be said on
cannot be driven by this since these relations are missing. Rather, it seems that
this passivisation is not a genuine Movement process, but an artificial combi-
natory process driven by non-syntactic requirements in direct contravention of
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the structural requirement of Movement operations.
4.4.3 PP-movement
There were also examples of Movement in How It Is, where PPs had been
shifted regardless of the problems these procedures caused (3.4). There are
many examples of this kind of behaviour in Worstward Ho:
(145) Worse failed. With care never worse failed. (9.2)
(146) See in the dim void how at last it stands. (10.4)
(147) Backs turned both bowed with equal plod they go. (13.1)
(148) Slowly with never a pause plod on and never recede. (13.1)
(149) From it in it ooze. (33.3)
(150) To last unlessenable least how loath to leasten. (33.3)
(151) Of the two worse in want the skull preying since unsunk. (34.2)
(152) Into it still the hole. (46.2)
In examples 145-148, the Moved PPs are unambiguous since the sentences
contain main verbs to which they can adjoin. In 145 it is ambiguous whether
failed is an adjectival past participle or a past tense verb, since and there is
no subject or object to indicate verbal relations, but there is no other local
constituent to which it could adjoin. All of the sentences seem to have similar
structures, where the adverbial elements are Moved forward and the verb is de-
layed until the end. Optional Movements of this kind are motivated by stylistic
concerns, and here this does not present any problems for interpretation.
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However, in examples 149-152 there are apparent Movement operations that
do not seem to behave as well. Each example has a sentence-initial PP which
seems to have been Moved from some other location in the structure. But
since there are no clear main verbs in all of the texts, it is unclear where they
may have come from as identifying the Movement involves locating the trace in
the VP from which it has been Moved. As a result these examples are near-
uninterpretable, since the lack of structural information for the PPs essentially
reduces them to non-sentential particles. In 149 and 152 in particular the resid-
ual structures of the text does not contain enough information for inference to
reconstruct any possible structural relation between the disjunct PPs and the
other constituents. As with the passive examples above, these examples show
that a breakdown in the predicative relations required for Movement 5 can result
in disorder so extensive that interpretation can become impossible.
4.4.4 Movement and experimental style
The artificial Movement process shares many similarities with the Deletion pro-
cess described above: the combinatory procedure mimics actual linguistic Move-
ment, as Deletion does ellipsis; they both lead to problems of illegibility that
do not occur in grammatical usage, as even the most unusual grammatical oc-
currences can be recovered (as with To it too in 127, or Be attacked by Kim
above); they both involve manipulation of language in contravention of funda-
mental structural restrictions. Movement and some kinds of ellipsis are stylistic
choices in normal language use (Chomsky 1995: ch3), and the procedures by
which these optional operations are performed are constrained by structural
relations.
The artificial procedures of Movement and Deletion are also stylistic choices,
5Hereafter capitalised Movement is used to distinguish the syntactic procedure ‘Move α’
(Chomsky 1995) from informal usage.
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but they do not seem to be constrained by structural relations in the same
way as with the natural language equivalents. The reasons for this difference
between natural and artificial procedures will be discussed in chapter 5, but
for the moment it is important to point out that these choices are stylistic in a
fundamental sense; that is, the departure from canonical constituent order in the
examples marks an optional change of some description that can be generally
attributed to ‘style’. It follows that the artificiality of the procedures above,
and the problems that they cause for interpretation, are the products of an
Experimental style that tries to manipulate language in non-standard ways by
moving pieces of language about as units of meaning, as argued in the section
3.6.
4.5 Discussion
What all the above examples have in common is that they involve the combi-
nation of morphemes and words without regard to structural restrictions; the
morphemes are treated as meaningful objects to be combined regardless of these
restrictions. The resulting expressions suffer similar complications to the exam-
ples of syntactic processes seen above: when the objects combined are highly
functional parts of language with specific structural roles, the meaning of these
parts can be lost in the unrestricted combination. In the examples where the
meaning can be understood without too much difficulty, the reader appeals to a
meta-structural knowledge in order to resolve how the meaningful parts should
be related. In the examples of false passivisation above the reader inferred that
the meaningful objects in the structure should be considered to have passive
relations since the overall structure resembled an actual passive construction;
essentially, the false passives are not processed by the grammar, but are handled
by a meta-knowledge of grammar that infers the constituents should be related
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in a manner like passivisation.
All of this shows that whereas Beckett’s Experimentation only tended to
affect the combination of well-formed constituents in How It Is, in Worstward
Ho the Experimentation extends to within phrases. As a result, Worstward Ho
is a far more challenging text for even the most prepared reader, containing
more ungrammatical and uninterpretable sentences in a few pages than in the
entirety of Beckett’s mid-period prose.
In both texts the Experimental style causes problems for interpretation, and
the evidence presented above shows that many of these problems are caused
by Beckett’s manipulation of syntax. However, it is interesting to note that
these difficulties can be overcome in many cases, and sometimes even the most
complicated text can be interpreted. It is also interesting that the difficulties in
interpretation are far greater inWorstward Ho than in How It Is, and that there
are significant differences in the kinds of Experimentation that might account
for this sharp difference in interpretability. The following section will discuss
these two issues in more depth, investigating whether there is a specific process
by which ungrammatical utterances can be interpreted, and why they cannot
be interpreted in some of the most extreme cases.
Chapter 5
Interpretation of
ungrammatical utterances
5.1 Introduction
This chapter is intended as a more in-depth theoretical exploration of the issues
raised in the previous chapters, aiming specifically to consider how the kinds of
ungrammatical utterances described above are interpreted in the texts. One of
the most striking features about experimental texts (exemplified by the two dis-
cussed above) is that they are almost always interpretable in some way, despite
a great deal of ungrammaticality and disorder in the discourse. In pursuing this
analysis, I will consider what kind of knowledge is used in the interpretation of
these ungrammatical utterances, and why this may be the case.
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5.2 Adverbs and disjunct constituents
5.2.1 Background
In the analysis above (section 3.4.3) it was stated that the examples sampled
from How It Is in 71-79 were treated as disjunct constituents analogous to the
parentheticals in 80-87. The utterances in which these disjuncts appeared were
not examples of ungrammaticality as such, but simply of unorderly discourse,
where the position of the parentheticals caused minor problems for the inter-
pretation of the host utterances. However there is much debate in the literature
on the contribution of parentheticals to the interpretation of host utterances,
as described by Blakemore (2006); in some versions, such as that proposed by
Potts (2002, 2003), the parentheticals are integrated syntactically into the host
sentences. This is an important issue for the study at hand, as cases like this are
subject to great debate within linguistics: for some, parentheticals can be de-
scribed as part of syntax, whereas for others they are explained by non-linguistic
knowledge i.e. pragmatics.
Therefore cases like these are important in the present study, since they
indicate how we should draw the boundary between linguistic and non-linguistic
knowledge. In Beckettian terms, these cases may be described as lying at “the
edges of syntax” (Banfield 2003); although a formal account of parentheticals is
by no means essential to the study of Beckett’s texts, the theoretical implications
of the division of linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge are significant. In the
following, I will outline the different accounts of how parentheticals relate to
their host sentences.
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5.2.2 Approaches to parentheticals
In one approach (Haegeman 1988), parentheticals are “radical orphans” with
no syntactic relation to the host utterance, and they modify the host only at a
conceptual level of interpretation by pragmatic inference. One initial problem
is that parentheticals may contain gaps (such as in as you know ) that are not
c-commanded, since the parenthetical is syntactically independent; Haegeman
answers this problem by proposing that the gaps in the parenthetical are inter-
preted by pragmatic inference in a similar manner to non-commanded pronouns
(Johni said that hei was going out). However, Potts (2002) provides evidence
to prove that this pronominal explanation is not valid, and instead resolves the
problem of the incomplete parentheticals by proposing that they are integrated
into the syntactic structure by pragmatic inference; that is, once the grammar
has failed to provide an adequate filler for the gap in the parenthetical, prag-
matic inference “kicks in” to index the gap with the host.
5.2.3 Conventional implicatures
Potts explains that the grounds for this pragmatic inferencing of structural
relations are in the conventional implicatures licensed by connectives like as. In
the pragmatics literature, conventional implicatures are implicatures that follow
from the conventional meaning of words (like as) that do not necessarily alter
the truth conditions of the main proposition. Consider:
(153) He was poor but honest.
(154) He was poor and honest.
(Matthews 2005: 75)
These sentences do not have the same meaning, but they both have the same
truth conditions; for either to be true, he needs to be both true and honest. The
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difference in meaning lies in the conventional implicatures of but, which imply a
relation of contradiction. Thus in 153, the implication is that his poorness may
be expected to exclude honesty, but it is not so in this particular case. Since
these implicatures seem to be licensed by the meaning of specific words, some
linguists (Grice 1989; Levinson 2000) argue that they should be explained by
semantics, and that the pragmatic inferencing that is involved in conventional
implicature is licensed by the conceptual (i.e. semantic) information encoded
by the expressions; essentially, the grammatical properties of the word license
the pragmatic inference. Thus in accounting for parentheticals, Potts argues
that the semantics of the connective expressions like as license the inferential
indexing of gaps in the parenthetical expression. Essentially, the parenthetical
is integrated into the syntactic structure of the host by the semantic properties
of the connective.
However, Blakemore (2006) argues that this account is inadequate, since its
explanation of gap-filling involves a syntactic reconstruction process that does
not occur in analogous cases. She shows that with other elliptical expressions,
such as elliptical answers to questions, the gaps are not filled by grammatical
reconstruction:
(155) Q: Did anyone see Jo?
(156) A: Yes (*Anyone saw Jo)
(157) Q: Would you like a drink?
(158) A: No, but how about some lunch? (*How about I would like some lunch
(instead of a drink))
(Blakemore 2006: 1677)
It seems that the grammatical reconstruction analysis does not need to be
invoked to explain gap filling in parentheticals, as it is possible to see gap-filling
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in parentheticals as the same phenomenon as elliptical answers, which we know
to be pragmatic.
Potts argues that these pragmatic processes can still be accounted for in the
integrated syntax model, where the pragmatic enrichment acts on compositional
semantic features, which he sees as part of the grammar. This is influenced
by Levinson (2000), where it is argued that some parts of pragmatics (such
as conventional implicature) should be allowed to be covered by semantics as
an alternative to relevance theoretic accounts of contextual effects. Levinson’s
case says that the relevance theoretic approach, in which truth conditions are
assigned by context and not by semantics, one cannot capture traditional sense
relations (like entailment, contradiction) in semantic terms. Blakemore states
that this argument misses the point, as
in a relevance theoretic approach, truth conditions are assigned not
at a level of linguistic representation, but at a level of conceptual
representation which is derived inferentially from the input provided
by the grammar in accordance with pragmatic constraints. This
is the level where, according to Haegeman, parenthetical adverbial
clauses are interpreted.
(Blakemore 2006: 1679)
To make this clearer, consider the following example:
(159) He is, as you know, a complete idiot.
In processing this utterance, the grammar produces the structure of the host
He is a complete idiot and the parenthetical as you know ; truth conditions are
assigned to the conceptual representation of the host; then the conventional
implicature licensed by the connective as acts as a pragmatic constraint on
relevance (Blakemore 1987), guiding the interpretation of the conceptual rela-
tions between the host and parenthetical after the truth-conditions have been
assigned.
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Differing theoretical approaches
One source for this disagreement is the definition of conventional implicature.
Blakemore (1987, 1992) and Wilson & Sperber (1993) argue for a semantically
minimalist definition: their explanation rejects Grice’s account of conventional
implicature as a process licensed by conceptual semantic properties of connec-
tives, and instead posits a procedural account of conventional implicature. In
this model, the connective expressions do not encode the conventional implica-
tures, but they provide “semantic constraints on relevance” that tell the reader
how they should understand the utterance. Blakemore (1992: 150) demon-
strates this with the discourse connective so. In some examples, the Gricean
account of the conventional implicatures is feasible:
(160) A: David isn’t here.
(161) B: So Barbara’s in town.
In this example so could encode the meaning of the conventional implicature,
which can be summarised as ‘explanation’.
However, in some examples the conventional implicature is licensed where
the summary ‘explanation’ does not match:
(162) A: (as B walks into the room carrying many parcels) So you’ve spent all
your money.
Here so does not explain anything since there is no previous utterance for it
to explain, but there is a conventional implicature similar to that in 161 licensed
by the connective. Blakemore explains that this is because this kind of use of
so and similar expressions like but, after all and moreover “do not contribute
to a propositional representation, but simply encode instructions for processing
propositional representations” (Blakemore 1992: 150-1); that is, they indicate
the direction in which relevance should be sought. This accounts for the many
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subtle contextual differences that can be found in these examples, as well as the
multiple distinct kinds of conventional implicatures that can be instantiated by
single expressions (for examples with and see section 3.3).
Wilson & Sperber point out that the procedural account is preferable for a
number of reasons, such as the fact that discourse connectives are
notoriously hard to pin down in conceptual terms. If ‘now’ or ‘well’
encodes a proposition, why can it not be brought to conscious-
ness?. . . The procedural account suggests an answer. . . Conceptual
representations can be brought to consciousness: procedures can
not. We have direct access neither to grammatical computations
nor to the inferential computations used in comprehension. A pro-
cedural analysis of discourse connectives would explain our lack of
direct access to the information they encode.
(Wilson & Sperber 1993: 17)
What this indicates is that the inferencing process in conventional implica-
ture is not licensed by conceptual (semantic) information, since it often resists
paraphrase, as in 162. Wilson & Sperber point out that grammatical relations
often resist paraphrase in a similar manner; it is arguable that this similar-
ity may contribute to a conflation of grammatical and procedural pragmatic
processes in the contested argument.
There are further theoretical points to back up the relevance theoretical
account. For example, the extension of the grammar into a semantic-pragmatic
region is not necessary to explain the properties of parentheticals shown; rather,
it is part of an effort to retain a strong semantics which can account for truth
conditions in the grammar, thus accounting for sense relations (contradiction
etc). Indeed Blakemore argues that the difference between these approaches is
rooted in two different views of the distinction between pragmatics and linguistic
semantics:
there is a fundamental theoretical difference between a pragmatic
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intrusion approach and the relevance theoretic one: Levinson’s com-
mitment to Grice’s assumption that any content derived inferentially
through conversational maxims constitutes an implicature leads him
to posit a system of default inference rules attached to certain ex-
pressions and constructions which are involved in the recovery of
what is said. These inference rules are distinct from, but parallel
to, the inferences involved in the recovery of particularized conver-
sational implicatures. In contrast, relevance theory is committed to
a unitary theory of pragmatic inference, constrained by the same
communicative principle, and there is no set of default rules.
(Blakemore 2006: 1679)
With all of the analysis of unusual constituents above, one of the implicit
assumptions has been that the unified theory of Relevance is correct, and that
instances of disjunction or ungrammaticality are interpreted as ungrammatical
utterances (by various means) or as disjunct constituents in a discourse of sep-
arate pieces. The question of theory is much larger than this discussion, but as
indicated above the empirical evidence seems to favour the relevance theoretic
account.
As mentioned above, Levinson’s departure from the relevance theoretic ac-
count is motivated by a desire to account for sense relations within the grammar,
and Wilson & Sperber’s contention is that this requires a set of exceptions for
particular situations. In the tradition of Chomskyan generative grammar, this
constitutes two related problems: the admission into the grammar of phenom-
ena that can be explained by other means, and the creation of a non-unified
theory for the explanation of a single characteristic (Chomsky 1995). This is
not necessary, since Blakemore shows that these parentheticals do have a set of
distinctive conceptual properties, and that the description of these properties
does not require alteration of the grammar. Specifically, Blakemore’s expla-
nation is that parentheticals perform meta-linguistic commentaries on how the
hearer should interpret the host utterance (as with as you know).
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Generally, it seems that “in every case. . . we can say that the role of the par-
enthetical is to indicate how the host proposition achieves relevance” (Blakemore
2006: 1683). This indicates that the perceived effect of the parenthetical on the
host proposition is not to alter its content or truth conditions, but to direct the
inferential interpretations of the proposition. So with example 159, as you know
indicates that the hearer should appeal to his own knowledge of the person under
discussion in order to understand the proposition that ‘he is a complete idiot’;
this does not alter the proposition in itself, but merely indicates how the hearer
should go about understanding it. Blakemore (2007) demonstrates a number of
other kinds of parentheticals that give similar contributions to relevance.
Advantages of the procedural account
The advantage of this procedural account is that it does not rely on a specific
set of grammatical properties for these relations to come about. For example,
it would seem that many parentheticals that are not introduced by connectives
have a similar import into the host utterance:
(163) we follow I quote the natural order (7.7)
In this example from How It Is, the parenthetical I quote has a similar
illocutionary force to something like as I said ; that is, it indicates how one
should go about interpreting the host utterance inferentially without affecting
the proposition in itself.
In previous examples the conventional implicature is licensed by the presence
of a connective, and this licensing is based on procedural rather than conceptual
information in the connective. Similarly, in the example from How It Is, there is
no linguistic expression for the introduction of the parenthetical and for the in-
stantiation of conventional implicature, but it still contributes a meta-linguistic
commentary to the host. Considering these parallel examples it could be argued
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that the procedural information that instantiates a conventional implicature is
not entirely contained by the connective itself, but rather by information deliv-
ered by the structural relations between the host and parenthetical. That is, the
structural fact of inserting an incomplete parenthetical utterance within a com-
plete host utterance indicates a conceptual hierarchy, where the host proposition
is the main point of relevance in the utterance as a whole.
The effects of conventional implicature derived from this simple fact can be
explained by Relevance: the parenthetical creates a disfluency in the host ut-
terance, increasing the processing effort in interpreting the utterance, but the
presumption of optimal relevance ensures that this disfluency is compensated
by increased cognitive effects. Since the increased effort is situated in accom-
modating the parenthetical within the host, the presumption is that there is a
relevance relation between these two propositions, and that the relevance should
be sought in the direction of the dominant host utterance. A connective may
narrow the way in which this relevance relation is sought, but its absence does
not jeopardise the interpretation of the utterance.
‘Bare’ and ‘specific’ conventional implicatures
This indicates that there is a distinction between kinds of conventional impli-
cature that are instantiated with specific words or phrases, such as that is- and
or -parentheticals, and those that arise without these phrases, such as the ‘bare’
example I quote discussed above. In his account of conventional implicature
Grice (1975) made a distinction between ‘generalized conventional implicature’
and ‘particularized conventional implicature’; here we are making a similar dis-
tinction but in a different (relevance theoretical) paradigm, so the term ‘bare
conventional implicature’ is used for the bare examples and ‘specific conventional
implicature’ for the examples with connective expressions. Both of these sets
function due to the properties of bare conventional implicature, which are simply
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procedural properties of parenthetical insertion that follow from the ‘structural
fact’ of insertion of an incomplete unit within a host unit. But with specific
conventional implicatures the additional phrases like that is contribute extra
information to the interpretation, based on their individual semantic and pro-
cedural properties; they direct the constraints on relevance in a specific manner
(as with ‘parentheticals of reformulation’; see Blakemore 2007). This accounts
for the fact that many different phrases can make different contributions to con-
ventional implicature, and that they can be separated by semantic properties,
as argued by Potts, but not accounted for entirely by those semantic properties,
as shown by Blakemore and Wilson & Sperber.
One question that may arise from this discussion is whether there is any
need to cordon off ‘bare conventional implicature’ from general operations of
Relevance. It is true that these two have a great deal in common: bare con-
ventional implicature arises from acknowledging the context in which a piece of
language appears and inferring relations between the context and inserted unit
based on a presumption of Relevance; all other processes of inference involve a
similar procedure, where context is assessed and Relevance sought.
However, the value of the distinction between these processes is that it cap-
tures operations of Relevance that are specific to language use: the property
that licenses the direction of Relevance towards the host is the distinction be-
tween host and parenthetical, which is rooted in the grammatical distinction
between complete and incomplete constituent. This absolute distinction does
not have an equivalent in any other system of meaning (Chomsky 2005); for
example in a sequence of photos or gestures, there would be no way of distin-
guishing a ‘parenthetical’ unit, since the meanings delivered by these means of
communication do not have any inherent notion of subordination or incomple-
tion. Bare conventional implicature captures this kind of specifically linguistic
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property.
5.2.4 Evidence from the texts
Capturing the relations between parentheticals and hosts in this general manner
thus allows us to explain the use and misuse of parentheticals in the examined
texts. Many of the examples of bare parentheticals from How It Is function
much like some of the examples of that is-parentheticals or similar constructional
forms:
(164) I see me now on my side I clutch it the sack we’re talking of the sack
with one hand behind my back (10.2)
(165) not fear I quote of losing it something else not known (10.4)
(166) we have I imagine our eyes open and gaze before us (29.3)
All of the parentheticals in these examples direct the interpretation of the
host utterance. In 164, the parenthetical explicitly clarifies the referent of the
pronoun it in the host; in 165 and 166, the parentheticals explain the context
of the host utterances specifically. Although the parentheticals are inserted
abruptly without any clear demarcation or introductory phrase, the fact that
these constituents appear within larger sentences without explicit syntactic con-
nection indicates that they should be understood as directing the interpretation
of the hosts rather than as entirely separate constituents. For example, I quote
is not understood as a separate statement of the speaker’s action at some sepa-
rate time and place, but rather it is understood as clarifying that the host is in
fact a quotation.
The fact that this connection is inferential and brought about by structural
factors primarily can be explained by referring to an analogous artificial example
like not fear I swim of losing it : the utterance is odd, since the meaning of the
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parenthetical does not match with the expectation of an elaborative Relevance
that comes with the structural role. To interpret this kind of utterance, the
reader would have to understand the odd parenthetical as a flout of one of the
conversational maxims (Grice 1975), where the flout would be understood as a
meaning itself; the jarring of the unconnected image might be understood as a
‘poetic effect’ (Sperber & Wilson 1995; Pilkington 2000).
There are similar examples in How It Is, although the dissociation of the
parenthetical from the host is often understandable by inference:
(167) on from there that moment and following not all a selection natural or-
der vast tracts of time (7.7)
(168) take the sack in my arms strain it so light to me (36.2)
(169) an apalca llama the history I knew my God the natural (14.1)
(170) my words mine alone one or two soundless brief movements all the lower no sound
when I can that’s the difference great confusion (21.2)
The referent of the pronoun all in the parenthetical in 167 is unclear, and
as result the meaning of the parenthetical and its contribution to the host sen-
tence is unclear; nevertheless it seems to function as a correction or elaboration
of something which is at issue in the host utterance, despite the fact that the
referent in unclear. In 168 and 170 the parentheticals seem to provide further
information about the objects at issue in the host utterances, even though the
referents are unclear. However, if the reader does not detect these inferential
connections between the hosts and parentheticals, it does not mean that the ut-
terances are uninterpretable or ungrammatical; rather, the reader understands
it as a flout of conversational maxims, where the discourse is deliberately1 un-
orderly. The contained utterance is understood as an ‘interruption’ rather than
1The importance of this understanding of deliberateness is explained above in section 2.5.3;
see also Sperber & Wilson 1995: 49-64.
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a parenthetical, and the disruption of the presumption of Relevance is offset by
some other cognitive effects relating to this kind of stylistic choice: for example,
reinforcement of the latent theme of indeterminacy. Note that the presumption
of Relevance would not put this indeterminacy reading forward ahead of the
parenthetical reading in this case, since it seems that the text is disorderly but
not entirely chaotic.
5.2.5 Conventional implicatures and the interpretation of
ungrammatical utterances
What all these examples show is that bare conventional implicature can hold
even when the communication of the host or utterance is not clear, and that the
strangeness of certain uses of parentheticals can be explained as a product of
specific expectations of Relevance and not of ungrammaticality. Conventional
implicature is an example of a pragmatic property that resembles a grammatical
property, since it involves constraints on usage based on structural information,
but it is notable that any breaks from these constraints are understood as flouts
and are normalised under a general presumption of Relevance.
This is because propositions are inherently productive2 ; any proposition p
yields the proposition ‘p is a proposition’, so any apparently deviant proposition
can be apprehended as ‘p is a deviant proposition’, which is in itself a stable
proposition and easy to understand. By contrast, breaks from grammatical
structural relations are not recoverable by general principles: in *John thinks
that she thinks himself to be clever, there is a violation of the c-command rela-
tionship between she and the reflexive pronoun himself, and this is not amenable
to inferential recovery since the reader does not meaningfully apprehend the
2Note that the productive power of propositions is not uncontrolled, as the principle of
Relevance provides controls the recursive nature of propositions. Sperber & Wilson (1995:
42) explains this matter with respect to “mutual manifestness.”
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c-command relation when interpreting it. When syntactic structures fail (or
‘crash’ in modern terminology), there is no reflexive operation to make sense
of them; since they cannot be interpreted as clear propositions, they cannot be
framed like ‘p is a proposition’ and recovered.
This is a significant difference between grammatical and pragmatic relations,
and its explanation gets to the heart of the distinction between grammar and
pragmatics generally. While both kinds of relations seem to involve the interac-
tion of structures and structural properties, there are major differences between
how they access structure. With grammatical relations, structural properties
are below the level of consciousness and are not clear upon introspection; as a re-
sult they cannot be paraphrased or reduced to simple propositions or meanings.
In contrast, pragmatic use of structure involves something very similar to para-
phrase of structure. Once the reader has parsed the sentence, he/she arrives at
a set of structures that are apprehended as a sequence3 , and the iconicity of the
given sequence - in the case of parentheticals, the interruption of one expression
by another - is interpreted as a structural relation. This sequential-structural
information then forms the basis for pragmatic relations, as in parentheticals,
where the recognition of the containment of the parenthetical is required for the
licensing of the conventional implicatures (as explained above).
There are two important points to make about this process. First, the
sequential-structural information is not grammatical information: it is derived
from a conceptual interpretation of the surface structures of the parsed sen-
tences, and does not involve interpreting grammatical relations between the
parenthetical and host. This process essentially involves apprehending parsed
sentences as linear objects, and thus converting their sequential appearance
3It should be emphasised that this is not how sentences are parsed in grammatical inter-
pretation; rather, sentences are parsed as objects with hierarchical structure, in which linear
order is only a surface feature of the structures produced by the hierarchical arrangement of
phrases (Chomsky 1971 [1957]).
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into meaningful relations. Second, it is a pragmatic process that is specific to
language, since the relationships of sequential structure can only be arrived at
once the grammatical structures have been established in parsing. Relevance
and other systems of maxims account for communication generally, and this can
be non-verbal as well as verbal, but in this example of conventional implicature
the pragmatic relations rely on structural properties specific to grammar.
It should be emphasised that this does not mean conventional implicatures
are generated by the grammar; rather, they occur as a result of non-generated
pragmatic interpretation of generated structure. This is explained by the in-
herent ‘doubleness’ of language, which is captured in the traditional generative
distinction between deep structure and surface structure: grammatical processes
act within the hierarchical deep structure, while pragmatic processes apprehend
language as linear surface ‘strings’, or representations of structure. The kinds
of flexibility in interpretation that can be found with these pragmatic examples
(as with flouts) can be explained by general properties of meaning relations,
specifically Relevance.
By explaining ‘structural’ pragmatic operations as iconic representations of
structure, we solidify the claim that pragmatics involves the relations of mean-
ings in context and reiterate that pragmatic and linguistic knowledge are dis-
tinct. The examples of bare conventional implicature seem to be at “the edges
of syntax” but are in fact instances of pragmatic inference between representa-
tions4 of syntactic structure. In the following section I will reconsider another
case which is at the “edges of syntax”, coordination, in light of this discussion.
I will consider what role conventional implicature plays in the interpretation of
the texts, and whether the texts can be understood as entirely ungrammatical.
4Note that the use of the term ‘representation’ from here down is not used in the technical-
linguistic sense, as described in Chomsky (1980) and Uriangereka (2002), but in the philo-
sophical sense as defined by Goodman (1976). The concept of a ‘representation of language’
may be understood as a ‘picture’ or some other depiction of the objects of language.
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5.3 Conjunction
5.3.1 Background
In section 3.3 we saw examples of conjunction from How It Is that were unac-
ceptable and this was explained by Huddleston & Pullum’s condition of “syn-
tactic likeness” (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 1290) for coordination. However
it has been shown (Sag et al 1985; Cormack & Smith 2005) that syntactically
unlike pairings can be generated by the grammar:
(171) John is [in a temper]PP and [surrounded by fools]V P .
(172) John is [hungry]AP and [in a temper]PP .
(Cormack & Smith 2005: 401)
Cormack & Smith explain this by appealing to the “rule of thumb” for coor-
dination structures: “each conjunct or disjunct behaves as if it were the host”,
and problems with this are caused by clashes of categorial selection (c-selection).
The main verb to be can take many different categories as complements, so a
variety of different coordinates can be added without any problem. Some of the
examples from section 3.3 can be reanalysed according to this:
(173) you laugh feel yourself falling and on with a squeak (26.3)
(174) is it nourishing and vistas last a moment with that (28.2)
(175) I part the mouth of the sack and questions (33.5)
In these examples, the ungrammaticality of the utterances arises from prob-
lems with c-selection: in 173, feel does not take the complement on with a
squeak ; in 174, there is a selectional clash between the singular inflection of to
be and the plural vistas; and in 175 part does not take the NP questions. How-
ever, in many of the other examples this explanation does not hold. Consider
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the following examples 7, 8, 10 and 11 from How It Is, which are renumbered
for reference:
(176) no more objects no more food and I live the air sustains me the mud I
live on (17.7)
(177) a fancy I am given a fancy the panting stops and a breathclock breath
of life head in the bag (19.7)
(178) the panting stops and scraps of an enormous tale (27.1)
(179) only one remedy then pull it in and suck it swallow the mud or spit it
out it’s one or the other and question (28.2)
In these examples, there are no specific problems with c-selection: in 176,
there is no controlling verb for the coordination; in 177 there is no constituent
to which a breathclock is coordinated, and there is a similar problem in 178;
in the first coordination in 179, there is no problem for to be to take the NP
complement question, but the problem is with extraction from the idiomatic
phrase; if the idiom is read as a parenthetical, it is unclear what the NP should
coordinate to.
5.3.2 Approaches to conjunction: conventional implica-
tures
What, then, is the explanation for the unacceptability of these examples of co-
ordination? Since the examples all seem to involve clashes in the coordination
of NPs with clauses, it might be argued that nominal and clausal coordination
involve the use of coordinators with different properties, but this seems unlikely
since there is no such requirement for the coordination of APs or PPs, as seen
above. Alternatively, it could be argued that the problem is not with grammati-
cal structure, but with the conventional implicatures borne by the conjunctions.
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The conventional implicatures of and -conjunctions are well acknowledged in the
literature and in everyday use:
(180) He ran up to the open window and jumped.
(181) She kicked the TV and the screen went blank.
(182) She drank a cup of tea and watched the blank screen.
In these examples, and licenses different kinds of conventional implicatures.
In 180, the conventional implicature is of temporal order, where his running
up to the window is followed by his jumping; these are often referred to as
‘narrative’ conventional implicatures. In 181, the conventional implicature is
much like that of the temporal examples, but carries the implicature of causality;
that is, it is assumed that the TV goes blank because she kicks it. In 182 there
is a conventional implicature of simultaneity, where she drank a cup of tea while
watching the blank screen.
As with the examples of parentheticals above, Blakemore (1987) argues that
these implicatures are procedurally rather than conceptually derived, and this is
supported throughout the literature (Carston 1993, 2002; Blakemore & Carston
1999). In concurrence with the analysis of parentheticals given above, Cormack
& Smith (2005) argue that the conventional implicature interpretations of the
coordinations are
based on iconicity, with temporal events paralleling the temporal
order of the relevant phrases, and the cause-effect ordering relying
on the temporal non-commutativity of cause and effect.
(Cormack & Smith 2005: 401, their emphasis)
It may then be argued that these examples of coordination can be ac-
counted for under the generalised form of ‘bare conventional implicature’ dis-
cussed above; that is, the structural fact of one utterance following another
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carries a general implication of causal or temporal order or argumentation. The
presence of specific conjunctions facilitate specific readings; for example, and
produces fairly standard implication of order, whereas but implies negation or
contradiction. Blakemore (1992) and Carston (1999) provide detailed analyses
of these phenomena and their different effects on the direction of Relevance.
It is also arguable that there are similar cases of bare conjunction to match
the examples of bare parentheticals seen above, as with asyndetic coordination
of phrases and clauses. As with all examples of conventional implicatures, the
coordination conventional implicatures can also be flouted for effect, as with I
might be fat, but I’m also slow.
5.3.3 A syntactic or pragmatic explanation?
The question, then, is whether the conventional implicatures explain the unac-
ceptability of the examples from How It Is. In all of the examples, the initial ex-
planation (guided by Huddleston & Pullum) was that the unacceptability arose
from the lack of syntactic ‘likeness’ between the coordinated utterances, but it
has been argued that these conditions are not syntactic given some counter-
examples. If we reconsider the problem as potentially one involving the conven-
tional implicatures, the conditions of likeness would not hold between syntactic
structures, but propositions. That is, there must be a ‘likeness’ of propositional
content at a basic structural level; declarative propositions must be coordinated
with declarative propositions etc:
(183) I need that book and you need to help me find it.
(184) No more runways and no more airport expansions.
(185) What is the time and when do I need to leave?
(186) *I need that book and where is it?
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(187) *No more runways and we hate airport expansions.
(188) *No more runways and when will you listen to us?
Note that the conjoined utterances in the unacceptable examples are rele-
vant to the previous conjuncts; this indicates that the problems are caused by
structural relations rather than meaning. This account also explains the unac-
ceptability of the other examples from How It Is, repeated above as 176-179. In
176, the first conjunct no more food has the illocutionary force of an imperative
command, whereas I live is a declarative proposition; in the other examples, the
mismatch is between declarative propositions and non-propositions (NPs).
However, all of the individual conjuncts are interpretable as propositions or
phrases, and the overall utterances are not uninterpretable. The unacceptability
of the utterances are derived from the inability to construct conventional impli-
catures to connect the conjoined utterances, as there are no inferred conceptual
relations between the conjuncts, as seen in examples 180-182. This might be
explained in Relevance terms: two utterances are combined by a conjunction
to produce a longer utterance, which takes more effort to process; but there
are no extra cognitive effects to compensate (since the conventional implica-
tures fail), so the utterances violate Relevance principles and are interpreted as
unacceptable communication5.
As stated above, the ‘iconic’ information of one conjunct following the other
forms the basis for the conventional implicatures, indicating combination, elab-
oration, and a specific linear order of precedence from left to right; hence the
non-conventional interpretation of He jumped and ran up to the open window
in contrast with 180 above. This ‘linear order’ processing of sentences is anal-
ogous to the processing of ‘insertion’ in the examples of parentheticals: both
5It should be noted that in many cases where pragmatic operations are explained in terms
of Relevance, a similar Gricean account could be given, in which specific maxims are described
as contributing to cognition. Relevance subsumes the maxims under a general principle, but
Grice’s maxims are useful for understanding the specifics of inferential relations.
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involve surface structure interpretations of language for the formation of basic
conventional implicature relations. It shows that, in establishing conventional
relations between parts of language, pragmatics does not have access to actual
grammatical structure, but only partial representations of grammatical struc-
ture.
Ultimately, what this discussion indicates is that there are pragmatic con-
straints on linguistic communication, and that these constraints arise due to
complexities in the decoding process that are specific to language. Communica-
tion involves decoding stimulus, and inferencing from the decoded information,
based on context and constrained by the presumption of Relevance. Thus when
Peter sees Mary pointing to the other side of the room, he first decodes the
visual stimulus to discern a pointing hand, and then based on his knowledge
of pointing and the presumption that Mary’s pointing is an act of ostensive
communication, he infers the communicated utterance ‘look over there’.
However, in language use there is an additional complication in the decoding
of the stimulus: when Peter hears the sentence He ran up to the window and
jumped, he decodes the sentence first as a grammatical object, with hierarchical
relations between subject, verbs and adjuncts, and second as an utterance in
space and time, where there is a linear order from left to right and one part
placed after another. It is arguable whether the second process can be described
as ‘decoding’, since it is a pragmatic process and constrained by Relevance like
any other inferential relations that follow; nevertheless, it is clear that this
process is specific to the ‘doubleness’ of linguistic form, and that it can be
considered as an automatic process which takes place following all grammatical
decoding processes.
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5.4 False passives
5.4.1 Background
In this section, we examine examples of unrecoverable ungrammaticality - that
is, constituents that cannot be understood as grammatical sentences - and con-
sider how they are interpreted in the texts. To begin with, we can examine
one of the most prominent examples of ungrammaticality in Worstward Ho, the
‘false passives’ identified in section 4.4.1, which are repeated below for reference:
(189) Say on. Be said on. (7.1)
(190) Say for be said. (7.2)
(191) See for be seen. (13.2)
(192) Bow it down. Be it bowed. (21.2)
(193) Be they so said. (27.2)
(194) Said for missaid. For be missaid. (37.1)
It was argued above that these examples seem to mimic imperative passives
like Be warned, and that in the non-linguistic imitation of Movement operations
the sentences became completely uninterpretable in examples 189, 190, 192, 193
and 194. The problems are caused by the conflation of agency relations; the
sentences ‘crash’ because the agency relations are not recoverable, and recover-
ability is the primary requirement for Movement. Thus in 189, it is not clear
who or what is ‘said’, and who or what does the ‘saying’. This is a fundamental
loss of meaning for an utterance, and such problems predication should make
the utterance entirely uninterpretable.
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However, there are a few features of these utterances that seem to contradict
this assessment. The most obvious feature is that these utterances can be un-
derstood as ‘passives’ in some way. The defining feature of passive Movement is
the reversal of the canonical positions of subject and object, and these examples
lack both components; rather, the only grounds for the passive ‘flavour’ is the
arrangement to be + past participle. As mentioned in section 4.4.2, the ‘false
passives’ are not interpreted as passives, and do not pass through the grammar
when they are interpreted, so this seems to indicate that the interpretation of
passive is at some non-linguistic level. It should be clear that the relation is not
encoded conceptually by the sequence to be + past participle, since the group-
ing ‘past participle’ is categorial and founded on formal rather than conceptual
properties.
5.4.2 Understanding false passives: more conventional im-
plicatures
A more likely explanation is that the relations are derived from conventional
implicatures carried by the procedural properties of to be + past participle.
Blakemore points out that conventional implicatures ‘may be associated with
certain grammatical constructions’ (Blakemore 1987: 74), as demonstrated with
the example of cleft constructions:
(195) It was Ben who ate the apple.
(196) It was the apple Ben ate.
(197) Someone ate the apple.
(198) Ben ate something.
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The cleft construction in 195 takes the proposition in 197 for granted (it was
Ben who ate what? ), whereas in 196 it is the proposition in 198 that is taken
or granted (it was what that Ben ate? ). However, both of these propositions
are non-at-issue, since they do not contribute to truth conditions, as utterances
195 and 196 are only true if and only if Ben ate the apple; thus 197 and 198
are conventional implicatures of 195 and 196 respectively, and the difference
between the different implicatures is produced by the different uses of the cleft
construction. A similar pattern can be seen with passive constructions:
(199) Ben ate the apple.
(200) The apple was eaten by Ben.
(201) Ben ate something.
(202) The apple was eaten by someone.
199 corresponds to the proposition in 201, and 200 to the proposition in 202,
and both implicatures are non-at-issue since 201 and 200 are true if and only if
Ben eats the apple. As with the clefts, the difference between the conventional
implicatures is licensed by the constructional differences between 199 and 200.
It is well established that the conceptual properties of Movements are not en-
coded by the grammatical constructions (Chomsky 1971 [1957]: 42-43; Newmeyer
1986: 27)6 , so the conceptual notion of ‘passivity’ must be a pragmatic aspect
of the utterance interpretation. It is arguable that this notion, which is often
associated with a loss of agency, is communicated by conventional implicatures
that come from the grammatical constructions of passives, and may be asso-
ciated with a generalised form of the proposition in 199. This explains the
fact that these conventional implicatures can arise even in ungrammatical ‘false
6Note that in the referenced texts the older terminology of ‘transformations’ is used in
place of Movement.
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passives’ as well as normal passives, since the conventional implicatures are pro-
duced on the basis of representations of linguistic structure rather than linguistic
structure. Even if the construction is insufficient to produce meaning as a gram-
matical utterance, it still presents a representation of the surface structure of a
passive (to be + past participle), which provides the basis for the conventional
implicature of ‘passivity’ propositions.
5.4.3 Conventional implicatures and grammatical construc-
tions
It should be noted that these conventional implicatures do not amount to full
meaningful interpretations of the false passives seen in Worstward Ho. The
sentences are not processed by the grammar and do not communicate full ut-
terances as a result; yet the surface structure of the sentences communicate
partial conventional implicatures that explain the general interpretation of the
utterances as ‘passive’. These conventional implicatures cannot themselves be
paraphrased definitively, since they are ‘filled’ relative to the base utterance as
non-at-issue explanations, conclusions etc. For example, the conventional impli-
cature The apple was eaten by someone arises from the general form [Something
specific] was X’d by [some general person or object], where the underlined verb
cluster is equivalent to the general form to be + past participle; with the base
utterance The apple was eaten by Ben, the [something specific] is filled by the
apple and X is filled by to eat.
Nevertheless, the conventional implicatures are not produced by the base
utterance itself, but by procedural properties of the interpretation of surface
structure facts of representations of language; thus in the case of the ungram-
matical examples above, the conventional implicatures can arise, but they are in
effect ‘hollow’, without definitive base utterances to fill them. Any interpreta-
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tion of the utterances must involve inferential construction of a base utterance
(based on the conceptual information provided by the residual structure of the
ungrammatical utterance), followed by the production of equally fuzzy conven-
tional implicatures. This explains the fact that many varied interpretations
can be provided for the false passives7 , but that they all must acknowledge
‘passivity’ as important to the interpretation.
The example of false passives shows that even the most ungrammatical sen-
tences can be read in some way, and that language-specific pragmatic processes
like conventional implicature do not require wholly legible linguistic structures
to function in a text. The interpretations that are produced by these pragmatic
means are very different from those produced by syntactic decoding, delivering
conceptual content rather than utterances which may yield full propositions.
The reading process with these ungrammatical utterances requires a high level
of attention from the reader, as the filling of ‘hollow’ propositions described
above involves inferencing from residual fragments of language rather than sen-
tences and this effortful process can only proceed if there is an expectation of
cognitive rewards for the reader.
As stated above, the important claim in this account of false passives is that
these ungrammatical sentences can be read in some way, and that language-
specific pragmatic processes like conventional implicature do not require wholly
legible linguistic structures to function in a text. In the following section I
will consider whether this account can explain the interpretation procedures
that take place with other kinds of ungrammatical sentences, to see whether we
7For example with Be said on there are multiple available interpretations: one interpre-
tation may take on in the sense in which it is used throughout, as an adverbial meaning
‘continually’, and thus produce the interpretation ‘It should be said continually.’ By contrast,
in Colin Greenlaw’s ‘elaborations’ (Internet 2) of the text - where he fills out the experimental
forms to produce fully grammatical sentences that try to capture the meaning of the text
- this sentence is rendered as ‘Let ‘on’ be said.’ This interpretation appears in brackets in
Greenlaw’s version, indicating the uncertainty about such an interpretation. Note that it
involves interpreting on not as an adverb or as a preposition, but rather as a representation
of the word, where it is understood as a nominal (interchangeable with ‘something’).
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could formalise the general property of language that allow non-linguistic inter-
pretation after linguistic form has failed to produce an interpretation. Such a
formalism is of great value to the project at hand, as it indicates that any linguis-
tic constraints on the production of legible utterances can be overcome by other
non-linguistic means, and that any limitations imposed on experimentation by
the medium of language can be overcome through meaning relations.
5.5 Movement
5.5.1 Background
One set of relevant examples for this discussion is the group of ‘artificial move-
ment’ examples seen in section 4.4.3, repeated and renumbered here:
(203) From it in it ooze. (33.3)
(204) To last unlessenable least how loath to leasten. (33.3)
(205) Of the two worse in want the skull preying since unsunk. (34.2)
(206) Into it still the hole. (46.2)
As argued above, these sentences seem to contain Moved preposition phrases
but they do not work since there are no clear verbs to which they can be adjoined.
As with the examples of false passives, the structure of the sentences cannot be
recovered syntactically, so the movement reading fails. However, these examples
are also like the false passives because they can be recognised as ‘Movement’
examples; that is, although they are not examples of Movement, they resemble
them because they both have sentence-initial PPs, and might be interpreted like
Movement sentences even though the syntactic structure is deficient.
The question is whether they are interpreted by similar pragmatic means as
the false passives. There are clear differences between the passives and these
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Movement examples: whereas the passive movements communicated a concep-
tual notion of ‘passivity’, PP-movement does not have an equivalent conceptual
paraphrase, and would not seem to contribute to the conceptual representation
of either grammatical or ungrammatical utterances. Nevertheless it should be
remembered that conventional implicatures do not necessarily have conceptual
paraphrase, since primarily they present procedural constraints on how rele-
vance is sought in subsequent conceptual inference; whether the constraint on
relevance has a paraphrasable conceptual import depends on the individual con-
struction. The procedural constraint on relevance provided by the false passives
is towards ‘passivised’ interpretations, which may be characterised as ‘without
agency’ etc. The question is whether the Movement examples also provide pro-
cedural constraints on relevance, regardless of whether this constraint can be
characterised by a particular concept.
5.5.2 Conventional implicatures and more grammatical con-
structions
With the previous examples, the conventional implicatures were instantiated by
structural facts of the sentences: for the parentheticals, this was the insertion
of an incomplete structure within a complete structure; with conjunction, the
appendage of one structure onto another structure; with passives, the presence
of a canonical verbal form to be + past participle. These constructions produced
non-at-issue implicatures and were licensed by the structures at hand. As shown
by the following examples, a similar pattern can be seen with sentence-initial
PPs:
(207) The blood oozed from the wound.
(208) From the wound the blood oozed.
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(209) The second attempt was the worst of the two times.
(210) Of the two times the second attempt was the worst.
(211) The blood oozed from something.
(212) From the wound something oozed.
(213) The second attempt was the worst of some set of possibilities.
(214) Of the two times a specific thing was the worst.
207 conveys the implicit assumption in 211, while 208 implies 212; 209 implies
213 as 210 implies 214. As with the passive examples, the difference is the change
in focus brought about by the grammatical structure; the truth conditions for
all of 206-210 remain unchanged, but the non-at-issue implicatures are altered
by the change in focus. What this indicates is that PP-movement, and any
other optional movement which alter the surface structure of the utterance, will
alter the non-at-issue propositions borne by the host utterance.
It should be noted that in both the passives and the PP-movements seen
above, the moved grammatical structures affect the not-at-issue propositions
in the same way: they shift focus from the subjects to the objects or adjuncts,
where the taken-for-granted element in the non-at-issue proposition becomes the
leftmost constituent. That the non-at-issue propositions should be affected by
linear position in the utterance may be obvious, as it is clear to any user that the
primary effect of movement is to emphasise the moved constituent. But it should
be emphasised that there is nothing syntactic to this emphasis: there is no
alteration of hierarchy within the grammatical structure, since the structure of
moved sentences are recoverable by nature; the location of the adjunct or object
does not create any meaningful differences in the syntactic relations. It seems
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that any given sentence carries a set of non-at-issue propositions, or conventional
implicatures, and the form of these propositions is underdetermined by the
linear order of the parts of the sentence. Any alteration to the order leads to
an alteration of the conventional implicatures.
As with the examples of parentheticals and conjunction, these examples of
Movement can be explained in terms of relevance. In English, sentences have
a basic unmarked Subject, Verb, X-element order (where the X-element can be
an object, adjunct or any other adverbial modification). This terminology in
itself demonstrates a ‘bias’ of sorts towards the subject, where the subject is
an established part of the sentence whereas the X-element is interchangeable or
optional. This is reflected in the kind of focus phenomena shown in the non-at-
issue propositions for the unmarked examples in 207, 209, 211, 213; with [The
blood]s [oozed]v [from the wound]x, the non-at-issue implicature is The blood
oozed [in some manner], where the optionality of the X-element is reflected in
the unemphasised X-element in the implicature. When the X-element is moved
to the front, however, the new word order is marked, and the moved element
becomes the object of emphasis in the not-at-issue implicatures, as seen in
examples 208, 210, 212 and 214.
It is arguable whether these implicatures can be explained in terms of extra
processing cost8 , but what these examples do show is that the conventional
implicatures of grammatical structures are apprehended relative to the linear
surface structure representations of the sentences, rather than the grammatical
structures themselves. This indicates that, in the relevance interpretation of the
utterance, the production of implicatures operates in a left-to-right manner in
8The ‘processing costs’ that Sperber & Wilson (1995) refer to are cognitive and conceptual,
involving inferential processes rather than grammatical ones, so any argument that the Moved
sentence structure involves more processing cost because of extra work in the decoding process
would be fallacious. Nevertheless, it might be argued that in the interpretation of a non-
canonical sentence, where conceptual items are found in a less common order, is more cost-
intensive simply because it involves combining conceptual items in a non-linear order.
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the absence of cues to indicate otherwise; this form of interpretation is settled
by the unmarked SVX order, and relevance processes act on this pre-existing
pattern.
5.5.3 Conventional implicatures and reconstruction
It should be clear from the examples discussed that the conventional implica-
tures that come with simple grammatical structures like these do not necessarily
add a great deal to the interpretation of the utterance. Whereas the conven-
tional implicatures carried by conjunctions are often rich and important to the
understanding of the utterance, the implicatures discussed above seem to do
little other than state premises for the inferential interpretation of the text:
for example, the implicature The blood oozed from something does not seem to
add much to that which is already encoded in The blood oozed from the wound.
Nevertheless, these implicatures are still vital to the interpretation of the ut-
terance, as they provide a ‘blueprint’ for the relevance interpretation of the
decoded utterance, implying the direction in which relevance should be sought
and establishing canonical emphasis.
It is important that features like emphasis should be created inferentially,
based on knowledge of canonical structures of surface structures, rather than
linguistically in specific components of language, as were they to be encoded
in linguistic form then separate linguistic forms would be required for all ut-
terances. For example, if one wanted to emphasis the Queen in the utterance
He swore at the Queen, it would require a new linguistic structure where the
emphasis-carrying component (say, the subject) was the Queen: the Queen was
sworn at by him, whereas in normal use tonic emphasis, as in He swore at
the Queen!, would suffice to overcome the conventional emphasis. However it
would not be appropriate to presume that emphasis was completely free to in-
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ference, since this would not provide any explanation for the fact that emphasis
in utterances (such as those examined above) typically falls on the initial com-
ponent. Therefore it seems appropriate that emphasis and such relations should
be derived initially by conventional implicatures, since this explains the fact that
they exhibit specific formal tendencies but are amenable to change with other
communicative cues.
For this study, the most important feature of the conventional implicatures
is that they do not need fully grammatical structures to function, and that the
‘blueprints’ provided by the implicatures provide a means of deriving the struc-
ture in the absence of a full grammatical structure. Because they are derived
from surface structure representations rather than grammatical structures, con-
ventional implicatures function wherever there is a legible resemblance of the
relevant surface structure; for example, in From it in it ooze the conventional
implicature carried by the non-canonical location of the PP indicates that the
PP is in fact moved from a canonical post-verbal location, thus implying that
there should be a recoverable sentence within the residual structure which would
take the PP as an adjunct. The blueprint for relevance serves to direct the in-
ferential reconstruction of the Deleted constituent, thus allowing interpretation
of the utterance in spite of many structural deficiencies9.
5.6 Deletion
5.6.1 Background
While conventional implicatures are important to the reconstruction of the
above examples, it is less clear whether they contribute to many other exam-
ples seen in the texts. A set of relevant data is the group of Deletion examples
9NB this partial legibility condition reinforces the language-specific nature of these impli-
catures: there is no analogous set of conditions for other kinds of communication.
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from Worstward Ho. As with the false passives and Movement examples, the
acknowledgment of Deletion itself involves acknowledging that syntactic struc-
tures appear to be present in some altered form. Consider this selection of the
examples given in section 4.3.3:
(215) Dim white and hair so fair that in that dim light dim white. (15.3)
(216) Where if not there it too? (18.4)
(217) Ask in vain. Or not in vain if say no knowing. (19.3)
(218) How better worse so-missay? (25.1)
(219) No words for what when words gone. (28.2)
(220) What were skull to go? (46.2)
As explained above, the interpretation of these examples involves inferring
the absence of words or constituents, which have been removed by non-syntactic
Deletion rather than by recoverable syntactic processes of ellipsis. However,
to know that these pieces are missing the reader must recognise the familiar
linguistic context: for example, in 215 he/she must recognise the complementizer
that and realise that it takes a clausal complement, so to make sense of the
utterance he/she must infer that the following constituent is a clause, and hence
missing a subject and a verb to control the adjuncts.
There is a similar process with the if -clause in 217, where there is a missing
subject, and 219, where there is no auxiliary verb the past participle gone in
the when-clause. In 216, 218 and 220, it is clear that the utterances should
be understood as questions, since they have sentence-initial question words and
orthographic representation of question intonation through question marks. To
interpret these sentences as questions, the reader is required to infer the absence
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of verbs, do-support and other aspects of question syntax which are absent here.
In 216 and 218 this is possible without too much complication, but in 220 it
is still almost impossible to reconstruct a plausible structure, since there are
various mismatches between the constituents in the residual structure.
5.6.2 Pragmatic explanation?
In the current discussion, the question is whether these reconstructions are in-
formed by conventional implicatures in the same manner as the examples of
Movement, conjunction and parenthesis. At first it may appear that this is the
case, since the complementizer and question constructions seem to license the
pragmatic inferencing that reconstructs the utterance. However, it should be
noted that the information that informs these pragmatic processes is linguis-
tically encoded in the residual structures. With the complementizer construc-
tions, the fact that the complementizers take clausal complements is a grammat-
ical feature of the lexical entries for if and that. The detection of the comple-
mentizer construction relies on knowledge of grammatical structure, rather than
relevance interpretations of surface structures, and any clause-internal conven-
tional implicatures would be attributed to the same source as those identified
in the section on Movement (i.e. to the implicatures of simple SVX structure)
rather than to the grammatical construction itself.
With the questions, it is less clear whether conventional implicature plays a
part in the reconstruction of the utterance since there are so many complica-
tions involved in interpretation. Questions are not propositions in themselves,
so there can be no not-at-issue conventional implicatures, even though there
can be implicatures based on what is asked: What did he say? implies He said
something. Nevertheless, it is clear that any such implicatures do not play any
part in the reconstruction of the missing do-support or verbs in the questions,
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as these implicatures only give guidance for the interpretation of the premises of
the question rather than any information about the question itself; the propo-
sitional form of the implicature does not match the question form, so it does
not give any guidance on the utterance structure. Rather, it seems that the
reconstruction of the questions is a conceptual inferential process, where the
conceptual information derived from the question words and the orthographic
question mark indicates that the ungrammatical utterance should be understood
as a question.
5.7 Summary
These examples show that conceptual and grammatical properties also con-
tribute to the reconstruction of ungrammatical sentences. It is likely that an
empirical study of the text and the instances of these different procedures would
show that grammatical and conceptual properties alone are involved in the re-
construction of ungrammatical utterances more often than with the aid of con-
ventional implicatures, as these properties are found in any piece of text where
there are discernible syntactic or meaningful relations. Nevertheless, the exis-
tence of constraints on pragmatic inference that are specific to language, and
that are processed procedurally below the level of consciousness, is a highly
significant point for experimental literature. The Experimental strategy of the
Beckett texts was described generally as ‘chunking’, where pieces of language
seem to be moved about and combined without respect to syntactic relations.
In the resulting discourse, different chunks were connected by Relevance rela-
tions between conceptual representations; that is, they were held together my
meaning and not by structural relations.
However, the examples of conventional implicature show that in linguistic
communication some kinds of non-grammatical structural relations are estab-
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lished between parts of discourse before the interpretation of conceptual rep-
resentations, and that these relations are established below the level of con-
sciousness. This indicates that there are structuring principles which act on all
inferential interpretations of linguistic communication, and that they apply in
advance of any conceptual interpretation. Essentially the writer has no control
over the fact that the reader will interpret structural relations between pieces
of text: even if the discourse is willfully unorderly and this unorderliness is one
of the main themes of the text, the ordering principles will apply before the
conceptual theme of ‘unorderliness’ is brought to bear on the text.
This is a fundamental constraint on experimentation in literary texts, and
it undermines the nature of experimentation with language to a great extent.
While many texts may seem to be radical in their disruption of structure and
discourse, the discussion above shows that there are aspects of meaning which
will be constrained regardless of experimental intention. This reflects a basic fact
about experimental texts: as long as there are discernible meanings within the
texts, the reader can construct a meaningful discourse and arrive at a coherent
interpretation.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapters, we have seen evidence from How It Is andWorstward
Ho that indicate the existence of specific trends in Beckett’s Experimentation,
and in chapter 5 we have seen that this evidence can be explained in terms
of grammatical and pragmatic theory. In this chapter we collect the findings
from the previous chapters and explain the implications for the fields under
investigation, considering to what extent the argumentation presented answers
the questions set down in the introductory chapter. For the sake of clarity the
findings of the dissertation are summarised as a series of claims based on this
evidence.
6.2 Kinds of ungrammaticality
One of the findings that arises from the description and analyses above is that
there are several different kinds of unacceptable utterances in the texts. Some
violated pragmatic principles: the parentheticals (3.4) were examples of un-
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orderly discourse, and could be understood by simple conceptual inference; the
conjunctions (3.3) showed the violation of conventional implicatures, which re-
semble grammatical relations and which are lost with the imbalance of proposi-
tions. Some other examples violate grammatical constraints: the PP-movement
examples (4.4.3) are not grammatical sentences, since they lack tensed verbs for
the PPs to adjoin to, but they are easily understood; the examples of Deletion
(4.3) were ungrammatical but could be reconstructed by pragmatic inference
to resemble propositions of grammatical utterances; the false passives (4.4.1)
were ungrammatical and could only be partially interpreted after significant re-
construction by inference. What this shows is that the experimentation of the
texts could affect interpretation in many different ways, and that some kinds of
relations are less susceptible to experimentation than others.
As mentioned in section 3.4.5, there is an interesting contrast between con-
junction and adjunction, where the sentence-internal grammatical relations of
adjunction seem more malleable than the largely pragmatic relations of con-
junction. When conjunctions are misused, the conventional implicatures are
lost since there is a mismatch in the propositional content of the conjoined
utterances; as a result the utterances seem unacceptable, and it is difficult to
comprehend a meaning for the conjunction relation other than simple sequen-
tial ordering as in a list. The misuse of a PP involves its detachment from a
sentence, but this does not cause any major problems for interpretation, since
for the most part the PPs are well-formed in themselves and they can appear
as non-sentential adverbials within the discourse. This shows two things: that
the loss of grammatical relations is not always fatal for the recovery of a legi-
ble utterance, and that loss of procedural pragmatic relations can cause more
problems than loss of some grammatical relations.
Why is this? One of the main differences between these two different sets
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of examples is that, in the PP-movement examples, the constituents that are
moved around are relatively self-sufficient units of meaning. In contrast, in
the conjunction examples the units under experimentation, the conjunctions,
do not have simple conceptual paraphrases, since their meaning in these cases
is represented by procedural conventional implicatures; therefore the misused
conjunctions cannot be recovered when they are misused, since they cannot
be isolated and interpreted as meaningful units in themselves. This indicates
that an utterance under experimentation is more likely to be recovered as a
meaningful utterance if the alteration involves a conceptually or semantically
self-contained constituent, and that experimental operations on formal relations
are far less likely to be recovered as meaningful utterances. This is confirmed
by the contrast between false passives and PP-movement examples, as well as
the contrast in acceptability between parentheticals and conjunctions.
There are two points that follow from this. The first point is that all kinds of
ungrammatical utterance interpretation involve the grammar in some capacity.
This builds on the discussion in section 5.2.5 about conventional implicatures:
it only becomes apparent that reconstruction can take place once the sentence
has passed through the parser, when the sound constituents (such as PPs) have
been recognised and the deficiency of the sentence has been acknowledged.
The second point is that this is the only involvement of the grammar in the
interpretation of the utterances, and that the reconstruction that is involved
in the interpretation of the utterances is conceptual and never grammatical.
This is evidenced by the fact that conceptual content affects the recoverabil-
ity of the constructions, accounting for the difference between PP-movements
and passives; by contrast, there is no conceptual factor in the recoverability
of well-formed grammatical movements. Thus, an experimental form is parsed
as a group of well-formed and ill-formed constituents, and pragmatic inference
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proceeds to reconstruct utterances, but not grammatical sentences; an ungram-
matical sentence is not ‘corrected’ by pragmatic inference, but it is interpreted
by contextual enrichment and understood conceptually.
Ultimately, what this indicates is that experimentation does not bring about
any changes to grammatical structure. Experimentation may lead to loss of
grammatical relations, as is obvious from much of the evidence presented above,
but there are no examples of experimentation bringing about new forms. This
allows us to make one of the most important claims of this study:
Claim 1 Experimentation does not produce new grammatical forms.
As mentioned in the introduction, many critics claim that, by experimenting
with language, writers can develop their own forms of language, reforming the
existing system in the service of poetic means. However, the evidence above
seems to indicate that the alterations made to language are not in fact linguistic;
rather, they involve pragmatic relations between conceptual representations.
The alterations of language do not access linguistic form, but rather they act
on representations of language; any correspondence between grammatical form
and the forms that are altered arises as a result of the fact that the forms are
associated with specific conceptual relations.
In the examples of PP-movement, the experimentation does not in fact in-
volve the movement of a PP, as it is not recoverable as part of a grammati-
cal utterance and the conscious experimentation does not have access to the
grammatical structure ‘PP’; rather, a piece of linear surface structure is placed
in a sentence-initial position and the resulting construction resembles a gram-
matical structure at the level of surface structure representation. There is a
similar explanation for the false passives and other examples of experimenta-
tion: the experimental writer does not have access to grammatical structures, so
the processes that create these artifacts act on surface representations of those
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structures, and ungrammaticalities and odd effects develop as a result of this
extra-grammatical manipulation of linguistic material.
6.3 Syntax as an object of literary linguistic in-
quiry
Another strong outcome from the analysis above is an affirmation of the formal-
ist literary linguistic approach to syntax. As described in section 1.3.3, Austin
(1984) proposes that studies of syntax in literary texts should focus on the
aesthetic effects syntactic deviation, and that we should devise “methodolog-
ical principles for analysing non-standard structures” (1984: 130) in order to
conduct these stylistic analyses. This approach assumes that the forms under
analysis are still syntactic, and that the description of the non-standard forms
should be in terms of breaches of syntactic rules specific to syntax. This line
of argumentation may be associated with the kind of literary linguistic theory
proposed by Kiparsky (1972), which suggests that there may be a grammar
specific to poetic texts, and that the ‘poetic grammar’ may contain the specific
computations necessary to account for the rule-breaking in literary texts.
However, in much of the evidence presented above, it is clear that syntactic
rules cannot account for the processing of many ungrammatical utterances. It is
shown in some cases that the apparent syntactic rule-breaking in fact involves vi-
olation of pragmatic principles, and that in other cases the ungrammatical forms
could not be generated and cannot be recovered by any means as grammatical
forms. In some of Austin’s examples from Romantic poetry, it seems possible
to argue that deviant forms are processed by special computations within the
syntax, and it seems plausible that the processing of deviation in literary texts
involves attending to a grammar specific to poetic texts. His examples show spe-
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cific rules that are bent in the poetic text, and if we were to follow the literary
linguistic theory of Kiparsky, the poetic grammar may resemble the everyday
grammar plus the bent rules. But if this is the case then the grammar would
also have to account for the examples of false passives (4.4) and Deletions (4.3)
shown above, and this is clearly untenable since the resulting poetic grammar
would generate sentences that are not even interpretable in the most basic sense.
The reply to this argument may argue that experimental texts are ‘excep-
tions’, and that the kinds of ungrammaticality described would not be accounted
for within a poetic grammar since the reader understands that the text is ‘exper-
imental’ and acknowledges that the forms should be experienced as deliberately
odd. Nevertheless, this would not offer any explanation for how these texts
are read. Furthermore, it would not be able to explain how one separates ‘ex-
perimental’ texts from other texts, since ‘experimental’ is a socially constructed
description and does not describe a specific set of properties that can be brought
to texts to separate experimental from non-experimental. This is clear enough
from the critical heritage of literary texts in itself, since the notion of the ‘ex-
perimental’ has changed throughout literary history with changes in convention
(D’Haen et al 1989); for example, the Romantic texts examined by Austin were
regarded as in some way ‘avant garde’ in their own time, as evidenced by the
contemporary scandal that met the genre experimentation of the Lyrical Bal-
lads.
Indeed it seems that the evidence above shows up some crucial theoretical
deficiencies in the theory of ‘poetic grammar’. First, grammar as a theory is
only useful if it can be formally defined and constrained, but in the case of poetic
grammar this is not possible. ‘Poetic’ is a concept and it cannot be formally
defined, and indeed some would argue that it is in the nature of the ‘poetic’
to resist such formalism; as a result the kinds of rule-breaking that occur in
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literary texts cannot be formally defined, and thus ‘poetic grammar’ cannot be
constrained or defined.
Second, there is a fundamental problem with the assumption that deviant
forms are processed by the grammar. Generative theory is founded on the as-
sumption that the grammar generates a specific set of grammatical sentences,
and that ungrammatical sentences are performance errors in the use of that
grammar. However, to assume that ungrammatical sentences are produced by
the grammar is to assume that errors are not founded at the level of performance
but within the grammar, and that these errors can be apprehended as a specific
set of computations with specific meanings. Essentially this imbues the gram-
mar with an ability to mark generated sentences conceptually as ‘grammatical’
and ‘ungrammatical’, whereas these concepts only exist as observations on the
output of the grammar. This is not possible since the grammar is a formal
system and does not attach concepts to generated forms in this manner.
It can be seen from chapter 5 that the explanation for the interpretation of-
fered in preference to specific syntactic computations is one based on pragmatic
theory, specifically Relevance theory. In doing so we agree with the proposals
put forward in Fabb (2004) to arrive at the following claim regarding literary
linguistic theory:
Claim 2 deviation in literary texts is not interpreted by form-specific linguistic
computations, but by pragmatic inference with respect to context.
In addition to the preceding negative evidence against the form-specific com-
putation analysis, there is also a great deal of positive evidence offered by the
analysis in this dissertation. Chapter 5 offers a theoretical description of how
experimental texts are experienced by readers, accounting for the ability to in-
terpret texts of varying degrees of ungrammaticality, including some which do
not even allow one to interpret agency or other fundamental relations. The range
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of kinds of ungrammaticality found in the text also seems to confirm this claim,
as the evidence of the texts did not seem to offer any specific kinds of linguistic
form that were invulnerable to experimentation. Indeed the only restriction
that seemed to apply was that the text resembled some form of language: even
though the false passives could not be processed as linguistic expressions (with
clear agency relations), they could still be experienced as language, conveying
some of the meanings that language usually encodes. This kind of process is
characteristic of pragmatic inference rather than formal linguistic relations.
It should also be recalled that this claim adds substance to Principle A in
section 2.4. There it was proposed that in analysing a deviant structure, we
should take the most grammatical reading available, and this seemed to be
more of a pragmatic guiding principle than one for grammatical interpretation.
However, what the above argumentation shows is that deviant structures are not
interpreted by grammatical means but largely by pragmatic means, based on the
most relevant interpretation of the base stimulus of the residual structure. This
shows that Principle A was not in fact a statement about grammatical parsing,
but simply a reiteration of the fundamental role of Relevance in interpreting
deviant utterances.
6.4 Literary linguistics and experimental litera-
ture
One of the other main points of discussion in literary linguistic theory is whether
there is anything special about literary language, or whether the literary context
allows one to do things with language that could not be done in other forms
of communication. It should be clear from the argumentation above that this
study concludes that literary language does not have any specific properties,
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and this can be formulated in a fairly uncontroversial, but important, claim:
Claim 3 The language of literary texts does not have any linguistic properties
that are not found in non-literary texts.
This kind of claim may not be of particular importance to most linguists, but
it is an important claim to make with respect to literary theory, not least since
it is formulated on the basis of analysis of highly experimental texts. What this
indicates is that the rules of language cannot be reformulated, and that literary
experimentation cannot bring about any meaningful change to the medium of
language. That one may try to ‘get behind’ language in order to find a truer
unmediated form of expression is a popular myth, inherited from Symbolism,
espoused by many Modernist writers and exhibited by the quote from Beckett
seen in section 2.5.3, and this kind of analysis affirms that it is indeed a myth.
It should be noted that while there is nothing specific to language in literary
texts, the kinds of pragmatic computations described in much of the analysis
would probably not be found in any other kind of communication. The infer-
encing processes described involve a great deal of processing and ‘work’ on the
part of the reader, as evidenced by the fact that these texts are experienced
as ‘difficult’ or challenging’. In the context of a deliberately crafted text, the
expectation of Relevance is much higher, and as a result the reader puts in the
extra effort in the belief that they will reap some rewards from the experience
of interpretation. But this expectation of Relevance has nothing to do with lan-
guage as a formal system, but with the cultural identity of literature, so there
is no need to alter our theoretical description of language.
That experimentation cannot effect any changes on linguistic form may seem
like a problem for avant garde theory, as it indicates that the artist cannot bring
about any change to the very medium in which they work. On the other hand,
the fact that literary experimentation is not defined by the formal system of
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language would appear to assert a certain degree of freedom on the part of the
experimental writer. Since the forms of experimental texts are communicated
by inference, they can effectively be labeled as ‘meanings’, and since there is no
limit to the number or kinds of meanings that can be produced then it would
seem that the experimentation of literary texts is essentially limitless.
However, we may recall from section 5.7 that the ‘doubleness’ of the lin-
guistic medium of literary texts always ensures that as long as texts resemble
linguistic forms, the inferencing of meanings will be underpinned by conven-
tional implicatures. While these implicatures can be overridden like any other
implicatures, the fact that they come about indicates that the knowledge of the
conventions of surface structures is always involved in the processing of lan-
guage; as a result, it is implausible to assume that literary experimentation is
entirely free, since any reader will always project their knowledge of standard
linguistic form onto the experimental texts at hand. This is an important point
regarding avant garde theory, so it is reiterated as another claim:
Claim 4 Knowledge of conventional linguistic form always informs the inter-
pretation of non-standard forms.
Thus while the production of experimental texts may not be defined by the
formal system of language, the specific properties of language impose specific
constraints on the interpretation of all linguistic communication.
Related to the discussion of avant garde theory, another interesting outcome
of this study is the affirmation of the value of studying experimental texts.
As stated above, the kinds of deviation discussed by Austin (1984) occurred
in Romantic texts, and the theory that the deviations should be considered in
terms of syntactic rules was derived from the fact that syntactic rules could be
discerned in these texts.
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However, in experimental texts like those studied, the deviation is far more
radical than that found in the poetry of Byron and Shelley, and as a result
it becomes impossible to construct syntactic rules for the production of these
utterance. This point showed up a crucial deficiency in this theory of deviation,
and showed that to base our data on the more conservative texts would be
unwise. The experimental texts act as limit cases for literature, and as a result
their radical forms direct the theory of form. To direct and redirect the theory
of literature is one of the main goals of the avant garde, and this dissertation
shows such a redirection in literary linguistic study.
6.5 Linguistics and pragmatics
It should be clear from the material above, and in chapter 5 in particular, that
the explanation of experimentation in literary texts does not involve a great deal
of syntactic theory. Rather the extent of the contribution to syntactic theory in
this dissertation is to assert that there is no need to extend its scope to account
for unusual use, since it is clear that to extend the grammar to account for the
examples encountered would cause fundamental problems. Rather the explana-
tion of experimental texts is in terms of pragmatic theory, and throughout it is
asserted that Relevance theory provides the best explanation for the phenomena
observed.
It was stated in the introduction that one of the main goals of any formalist
literary linguistic investigation is to be able to ‘feed back’ into linguistic the-
ory, that is to try to gain an understanding of how language works in general
by observing closely how it works in literary texts. While there is little to of-
fer to syntactic theory other than an affirmation of the value of constraining
the grammar, it does seem that the discussion of the interpretation of ungram-
matical utterances offers evidence for some important claims about pragmatic
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theory.
In section 5.2.3 it was asserted that the procedural account of conventional
implicatures was the only plausible explanation for the evidence at hand, but
it was then proposed that the kinds of conventional implicatures observed in a
variety of unusual grammatical forms could be generalised as ‘bare’ or ‘specific’
conventional implicatures, where the conventional implicatures are licensed by
knowledge of surface structures of language (for example SVX and marked vari-
ants). This involved a Relevance theoretic generalisation of conventional impli-
catures analogous but not concurrent with the (linguistic semantic) explanation
offered by Levinson (2000) and Grice (1989).
This discussion may give rise to a claim about pragmatic theory, specifically
about conventional implicatures:
Claim 5 Conventional implicatures arise as a result of a reader’s knowledge
about the conventions of the surface structures of linguistic form.
One of the most important points to observe in this claim, and in the gen-
eralisations made available by the evidence, is that the pragmatic inferencing
processes described only ever involve knowledge of surface structure represen-
tations of linguistic structure, and never actual linguistic structure. That is,
pragmatic inference does not access aspects of linguistic structure like phrase
structure or phrase order, and the instances in which it seems to act on linguistic
structure (for example with conjunction), in fact it is only accessing representa-
tions of structure, and these representations are conceptual, based on ‘iconicity’
and other non-linguistic knowledge. This might lead us to a more contentious
and provocative claim, that pragmatic knowledge does not have access to lin-
guistic form, but since the only pragmatic theory under examination here has
been conventional implicatures it would not be possible to make such a claim
regarding pragmatic theory in general. However the evidence presented does
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seem to indicate that such a claim may be plausible, and it may be a point
worthy of further investigation.
6.6 Summary
In this dissertation I have tried to explore a number of important questions
regarding literary theory, linguistic theory and literary linguistic theory, and
this conclusion arrives at a number of claims regarding these different fields.
It is notable that many of these claims seem to offer as much for one field as
another, and this indicates the value of examining this kind of literature in
this manner. However I also hope that these claims also open up a number of
questions for the fields of inquiry, as this must be the highest expectation for
any study of this size on topics as wide-ranging and fascinating.
Appendix A
Stock phrases in How It Is
This appendix provides details of a set of the ‘stock phrases’ in the part section
of How It Is, as described in section 2.5. In the following set of data, the
numbers describe the page no.paragraph no coordinate of the occurrences, as
above. The purpose of including this data is to give an indication of the extent
of the repetition in the text, as this is an important factor in establishing the
existence of the ‘chunking’ style described above.
• bits and scraps: 7.7, 15.2, 20.2, 20.3, 20.4, 24.3(x2), 25.6, 39.3, 47.4
• brief movements of the lower face: 7.5, 14.5, 18.4, 26.3, 36.6, 44.6, 44.7,
46.4
• how it is: 7.1, 16.10, 20.2, 20.3, 24.3, 39.3
• how it was: 7.1, 7.7, 10.5, 16.6, 16.10(x3), 20.2, 24.3(x4), 27.2, 37.4,
39.3(x2), 48.4
• I quote: 7.1, 7.7(x2), 8.3, 10.4, 16.9, 28.1
• I say it as I hear it : 7.1, 10.1, 10.5, 14.5, 15.2, 19.3, 20.2, 20.6, 27.3, 28.7,
28.5, 31.7, 34.3, 40.4, 42.1, 46.3
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• it’s one or the other : 8.6(x2), 11.7, 18.2, 22.3, 24.4, 28.2, 44.7, 45.7, 48.1
• it’s preferable: 7.6, 19.2, 19.3, 24.4, 25.7, 32.7, 33.5, 47.3
• murmur in the mud (in some variations i.e. murmured in the mud): 7.3,
9.8, 10.5, 14.5, 15.2, 20.2, 20.5, 24.3, 46.3, 47.4
• something wrong there: 8.6, 9.4, 10.3, 14.3, 16.6, 25.2, 28.6, 34.2, 37.4,
40.1, 43.1, 43.7
• vast stretch [or tract ] of time: 7.7(x2), 8.2, 9.1, 16.6, 16.10, 18.8, 22.2,
25.7, 27.1, 34.4, 39.3
• we’re talking of [the sack & some variations]: 8.3, 10.2, 14.7, 15.3, 26.5,
33.8, 34.3, 36.3, 47.2, 47.4
• when the panting stops: 7.2, 7.4, 12.3, 15.2, 20.2, 20.4, 24.3, 39.3, 47.
• Multiple stock phrases occurring in single paragraphs: 10.5, 14.5, 16.10,
20.2, 24.3, 39.3, 47.2
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